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1 Introduction
Search engines are among the most important information gatekeepers of the Internet era. Google
alone receives over 3.5 billion search queries per day, and, according to some estimates, 80% of
them are informational, dwarfing navigational and transactional searches (Jansen et al., 2008).
Individuals increasingly use search engines to look for information on a vast array of topics such
as science (Horrigan, 2006), birth control and abortion (Kearney and Levine, 2014), or the pros
and cons of alternative electoral outcomes (e.g., the Brexit referendum in the UK; see Google
Trends). Remarkably, what determines the ranking of any website to be displayed for any given
search query are automated algorithms. Such algorithms are also used by social media—such as
Facebook and Twitter—to rank their posts or tweets. They are so fundamental in establishing
what is relevant information or what are relevant information sources, that they necessarily con-
vert search engines and social media platforms into de facto “algorithmic gatekeepers” (Introna
and Nissenbaum, 2000; Rieder, 2005; Granka, 2010; Napoli, 2015; Tufekci, 2015). Despite the
importance of such ranking algorithms for a wide variety of online platforms, opinion dynamics
via algorithmic rankings is largely understudied.
This paper aims to fill this gap by developing a dynamic framework that studies the interaction
between individual searches and a stylized ranking algorithm. As actual algorithms used by
platforms such as Google or Facebook are highly complex (Dean, 2013; MOZ, 2013; Vaughn, 2014),
we do not aim to pin down the exact pattern of website traffic or opinion dynamic generated
by any specific algorithm, nor do we pursue a mechanism design approach. Rather, our aim
is to isolate few essential components of ranking algorithms and to study their interplay with
individual clicking behavior. Specifically, we focus on two key aspects of ranking algorithms:
(a) rankings may be based on the popularity of the different websites, (b) rankings may be
personalized and may depend on individuals’ characteristics. These two aspects drive the ranking
of the available websites provided to individuals by a search engine.
Individuals use the search engine to look for information on the state of the world (e.g.,
whether or not to vaccinate a child). Their choices over websites are modeled by means of
a random utility model (Luce, 1959; Block and Marschak, 1960; Gu¨l et al., 2014). This yields
probabilities of reading the ranked websites that depend on both website content and ranking. As
a result, individuals tend to choose websites that are: (i) higher-ranked (De Cornie`re and Taylor,
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2014; Taylor, 2013; Hagiu and Jullien, 2014; Burguet et al., 2015), (ii) ex-ante more informative,
(iii) confirm their prior information (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005; Gentzkow and Shapiro,
2010), and (iv) they may trade off content and ranking as a result of their stochastic choices.
Website rankings are endogenous meaning that individuals’ choices feed back into the search
engine’s rankings, thereby affecting future searches (Demange, 2014a). It is important to point
out that individuals are na¨ıve with respect to the search engine’s algorithm in the sense that they
do not make any inference from the websites’ rankings per se. This last assumption—apart from
making the model tractable—reflects informational and behavioral limitations of individuals in
understanding the working of ranking algorithms (Granka, 2010; Eslami et al., 2016).1
The model provides three main insights deriving from the interaction of the ranking algo-
rithm with sequential individual searches. First, we uncover a fundamental property induced by
popularity-based rankings, which we call the advantage of the fewer (AOF ). It says that, all
else equal, fewer websites carrying a given signal may attract more traffic overall, than if there
were more of them. Popularity-based rankings amplify the static effect of simply concentrating
audiences on fewer outlets, since they induce relatively higher rankings for the fewer outlets,
which makes them more attractive for subsequent individuals, further raising their ranking and
so on, generating a “few get richer” dynamic with a potentially sizeable effect in the limit. To
the best of our knowledge, this property of popularity-based rankings has not yet been pointed
out in the literature. We show that AOF holds well beyond the assumptions of our basic model.
Importantly, AOF highlights a further, ranking-driven, channel for why “alternative-facts” web-
sites may thrive and gain in authority in the current information environment, dominated by
algorithmic gatekeepers, such as search engines and social media (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017;
Allcott et al., 2018).2
Second, we provide conditions under which popularity-based rankings can effectively aggre-
gate information. We compare asymptotic learning under popularity-based rankings and under
fully random rankings. Not surprisingly, we find that popularity-based rankings do better as long
1While popularity and personalization are well-established components of ranking algorithms, exact details of
the algorithms are typically kept secret (Dean, 2013; MOZ, 2013; Vaughn, 2014; Kulshrestha et al., 2018). As
Eslami et al., (2016), p. 1, point out, the “operation of these algorithms is typically opaque to users.”
2Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) provide an economic model of fake-news and also document that, in the run-up
to the 2016 US presidential election, more than 60% of traffic of fake news websites in the US came from referrals
by algorithmic gatekeepers (i.e., search engines and social media). See also Azzimonti and Fernandes (2018) for
a model on the diffusion of fake-news in social networks.
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as individuals generate sufficiently positive feedback through their searches (e.g., their private
signals are not too noisy, or their preference for confirmatory news is not too strong).
Third, we study whether personalized rankings can contribute to information aggregation.
We compare asymptotic learning under both personalized and non-personalized rankings. We
find that there is a close relationship between the conditions under which non-personalized rank-
ings outperform personalized rankings with the ones under which popularity-based rankings
outperform random rankings. For the common-value searches of our model, personalization lim-
its the feedback among individuals in the opinion dynamic, making it better not to personalize
the ranking when individuals’ choices over websites generate a positive feedback. As a conse-
quence, personalized rankings are often dominated in terms of asymptotic learning either by
non-personalized rankings or by random rankings. Finally, we also show that personalized rank-
ings can induce relatively similar individuals to read different websites, which can lead to belief
polarization.
We conclude with two caveats. The results of our model provide some first insights on
opinion dynamics via algorithmic rankings with na¨ıve individuals. A similar model with more
sophisticated individuals who can observe the evolution of the ranking sufficiently accurately
may well predict that such individuals are likely to always learn the true state of the world in
the limit (see Section 6.3). As emphasized above, the na¨ıvite´ in our model reflects informational
and behavioral limitations of individuals in assessing the working of the ranking algorithm and
provides a natural benchmark for understanding online misinformation. Second, while our results
suggest that personalization may often be sub-optimal in the context of individuals looking for
information on common value issues (e.g., whether or not to vaccinate a child), when individuals
care differently about the objects of their searches (e.g., where to have dinner) an appropriately
personalized search algorithm might clearly outperform a non-personalized one.
Related Literature.
To our knowledge, ours is the first paper in economics to analyze opinion dynamics via
endogenous algorithmic rankings and the informational gate-keeping role of search engines.3
The paper is broadly related to the economics literature on the aggregation of information dis-
3The existing economics literature on search engines has focused on the important case where search engines
have an incentive to distort sponsored and organic search results in order to gain extra profits from advertising
and product markets (Taylor, 2013; De Cornie`re and Taylor, 2014; Hagiu and Jullien, 2014; Burguet et al., 2015).
See also Grimmelmann (2009) and Hazan (2013) for a legal perspective on the issue.
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persed across various agents (Bikhchandani et al., 1998; Piketty, 1999; Acemoglu and Ozdaglar,
2011; provide surveys on information aggregation, respectively, through observation of behav-
ior of others, through voting, and through learning in social networks). We share with this
literature the focus on understanding the conditions under which information that is dispersed
among multiple agents might be efficiently aggregated. Our framework differs from this litera-
ture in a simple and, yet, crucial aspect: we are interested in investigating the role played by a
specific (yet extensively used) “tool” of information diffusion/aggregation, namely, the ranking
algorithm, which represents the backbone of many online platforms. Another feature we have in
common with a subset of this literature is that we take a non-Bayesian approach and consider
individuals who are na¨ıve with respect to some key aspects of their choice situation (i.e., the
ranking algorithm). In this sense, our model is closer to the papers on non-Bayesian belief for-
mation (DeGroot, 1974; DeMarzo et al., 2003; Acemoglu et al., 2010; Golub and Jackson, 2010).
Moreover, although our individuals perform only one search, “learning” occurs through the rank-
ing algorithm that aggregates the information reflected in the clicking behavior and passes it on
to subsequent individuals.
Our focus on search engines as information gatekeepers is close in spirit to the economic
literature on news media (see DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2010; Prat and Stro¨mberg, 2013, for
surveys). At the same time, the presence of an automated ranking algorithm makes search
engines—and other algorithmic gatekeepers—fundamentally different from news media, where
the choice of what information to gather and disclose is made on a discretionary, case-by-case
basis. In the case of search engines the gate-keeping is unavoidably the result of automated
algorithms (Granka, 2010; Tufekci, 2015).4 Therefore, whatever bias might originate from search
engines, its nature is intrinsically different from one arising in, say, traditional news media. As
a result, studying the effects of search engines on the accuracy of individuals’ beliefs, requires a
different approach from the ones used so far in theoretical models of media bias (e.g., Stro¨mberg,
2004; Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006).
Finally, the paper is also related to the literature outside economics discussing the possible
implications of the search engines’ architecture (or, more generally, of algorithmic gatekeeping)
4Put differently, “While humans are certainly responsible for editorial decisions, these [search engine] decisions
are mainly expressed in the form of software which thoroughly transforms the ways in which procedures are
imagined, discussed, implemented and managed. In a sense, we are closer to statistics than to journalism when
it comes to bias in Web search”; Rieder and Sire (2013), p. 2.
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on democratic outcomes. This literature encompasses communication scholars (Hargittai, 2004;
Granka, 2010), legal scholars (Goldman, 2006; Grimmelmann, 2009; Sunstein, 2009), media ac-
tivists (Pariser, 2011), psychologists (Epstein and Robertson, 2015), political scientists (Putnam,
2001; Hindman, 2009; Lazer, 2015), sociologists (Tufekci, 2015) and, last but not least, computer
scientists (Cho et al., 2005; Menczer et al., 2006; Pan et al., 2007; Glick et al., 2011; Flaxman et
al., 2016; Bakshy et al., 2015).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the framework. Section 3 presents
our central result concerning the effects of the search engine’s ranking algorithm on website
traffic: the advantage of the fewer. Section 4 presents the implications of the model in terms
of asymptotic learning, also providing a comparison with a fully randomized ranking. Section 5
discusses the effects of personalization of search results on belief polarization and asymptotic
learning. Section 6 discusses some extensions which assess the robustness of the results of the
benchmark model and provide further insights. Section 7 concludes. Finally, all the proofs and
some formal definitions are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
We present a stylized model of a search environment where individuals use a search engine to look
for information on a fixed issue (e.g., whether or not to vaccinate a child) that is dispersed across
websites. At the center of the model is a search engine characterized by its ranking algorithm,
which ranks and directs individuals to the different websites, using, among other things, the
popularity of individuals’ choices. To simplify the analysis, we assume that individuals are na¨ıve
and perform exactly one search, one after the other, without knowing who searched before them
and without updating prior beliefs after observing the ranking. We also assume websites simply
report their own private signal, assumed to be constant throughout. We describe the formal
environment.
2.1 Information Structure
There is a binary state of the world ω, which is a
(
1
2
, 1
2
)
Bernoulli random variable which takes one
of two values from the set {0, 1}. There are M information sources (websites) and N individuals,
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where, by slight abuse of notation, we let M = {1, . . . ,M}, N = {1, . . . , N} also denote the
set of websites and individuals, respectively. For convenience, we assume M is an odd number
(unless otherwise noted). Each website m ∈M receives a private random signal, correlated with
the true state ω,
ym ∈ {0, 1} with P(ym = ω | ω = ξ) = q ∈
(
1
2
, 1
)
, for any ξ ∈ {0, 1}.
This determines the website majority signal, denoted yK ∈ {0, 1}, which is the signal that is
carried by a majority of websites; let K = {m ∈ M | ym = yK} denote the set (and number) of
websites carrying the signal yK . Similarly, each individual n ∈ N receives two private random
signals:
xn ∈ {0, 1} with P(xn = ω | ω = ξ) = p ∈
(
1
2
, 1
)
, for any ξ ∈ {0, 1},
which reflects the individual’s prior on the true state of the world, and,
zn ∈ {0, 1} with P(zn = yK | yK = ζ) = µ ∈
(
1
2
, 1
]
, for any ζ ∈ {0, 1},
which is independent of xn, when conditioned on (ω, yK), and reflects the individual’s prior about
what the majority of websites (e.g., mainstream or “authoritative” websites) are reporting.
We assume all signals to be conditionally independent across individuals and websites, when
conditioned on (ω, yK), and that µq > p.
5 This very last condition implies not only that, from an
ex-ante perspective, the website signals (ym) and hence also the website majority signal (yK) are
more informative than the individual private signals on the state of the world (xn), but also that,
for a given individual, his private perceived website majority signal (zn) is also more informative
than his other signal (xn). Among other things, the signals zn allow us to introduce a “rational”
side to individuals’ choices as we will discuss further below. From the onset, we emphasize
that the case µ ≤ 1 is meant to capture the intrinsic noise faced by individuals in identifying
5This condition implies:
µ
∑
K>M2
(
M
K
)
qK(1− q)M−K + (1− µ)
∑
K>M2
(
M
K
)
qM−K(1− q)K > p and q > p,
where the first inequality implies that an individual’s signal zn is ex ante more informative about ω than the same
individual’s signal xn; and the second inequality implies that a website’s signal ym is ex-ante more informative
about ω than an individual’s signal xn.
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the ex-ante more informative website majority signal (yK). Accordingly, (1 − µ) represents the
probability that an individual incorrectly identifies the minority signal as the majority one (e.g.,
looking at a website reporting “alternative facts” believing that it is reporting mainstream or
“authoritative” news). All the main conclusions remain unchanged if we assume µ = 1, meaning
that individuals can perfectly identify the majority signal (e.g., individuals know which are the
mainstream websites appearing in the search result pages).
2.2 Information sources
Each of the M websites represents an information source. A website is characterized by a signal
ym ∈ {0, 1} as described above, which is posted and held constant throughout. Websites can be
seen as articles or documents posted on the web that contains pertinent information to a given
search query.
2.3 Individuals
Individuals in N enter in a random order, sequentially, such that, at any point in time t, there
is a unique individual t ≡ n ∈ N , who receives random (i.i.d.) signals (xn, zn) ∈ {0, 1}2 as
specified above, who performs exactly one search, faces the ranking and chooses a website to
read.6 When choosing which website to read, individuals make a stochastic choice derived from
a random utility model (Luce, 1959; Block and Marschak, 1960; G’´ul et al., 2014; Agranov and
Ortoleva, 2017, provide empirical evidence),
ρn,m =
vn,m∑
m′∈M vn,m′
, (1)
where ρn,m is the probability individual n clicks on website m, and where vn,m is the value derived
from clicking on website m. The values vn,m are to be interpreted as measuring desirability in
the sense of a stochastic preference, which, as we will see, reflect a ranking aspect and a content
aspect of website m. We now define the vn,m’s in two steps.
Website content. Suppose individuals see all websites ranking-free, that is, each one with equal
probability (fixing content). As mentioned, each individual receives the signals (xn, zn) ∈ {0, 1}2.
6For reasons of tractability, we assume that all individuals perform the same search query exactly once.
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We use these signals to define attributes (see G’´ul et al., 2014) that yield value to the individual
in the following sense. Reading a website m, with ym = xn, yields value γ ∈ [0, 1], where the
parameter γ calibrates the preference for reading like-minded news (Mullainathan and Shleifer,
2005; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010).7 At the same time, reading a website m, with ym = zn, yields
value 1− γ, which reflects the desirability associated with reading the ex-ante most informative
signal.8 Using xn and zn to define attributes (with a normalization such that the value of having
both attributes is 1), we obtain the ranking-free values from selecting website m,
v∗n,m =

1
[m]
if xn = ym = zn
γ
[m]
if xn = ym 6= zn
1−γ
[m]
if xn 6= ym = zn
0 if xn 6= ym 6= zn
, (2)
where [m] = #{m′ ∈ M |ym′ = ym} is the number of all websites with the same signal as m.
The division by [m] avoids the usual Luce effect when dealing with duplicate alternatives. It
also allows us to interpret the v∗m,n’s both as values as well as the individual stochastic ranking-
free website choices. In particular, v∗n : {0, 1}2 → ∆(M) depends only on the private signals
(xn, zn) ∈ {0, 1}2.
Website rankings. Let rn ∈ ∆(M) be the ranking of the M websites at time t ≡ n; the
ranking is provided by the search engine (as discussed in the next section). Individuals ignore
who searched before them and do not update their beliefs about the true state of the world ω
after observing the ranking. Moreover, we assume they can process the ranked list, subject to
limitations of attention, meaning they implicitly favor higher ranked websites due to attention
bias. Indeed, as shown by Pan et al. (2007); Glick et al. (2011); Yom-Tov et al. (2013);
Epstein and Robertson (2015), keeping all other things equal (e.g., the fit of a given website with
respect to the individual’s preferences), highest ranked websites tend to receive significantly more
“attention” by users than lower ranked ones.9 Since we model the ranking (rn) as a probability
7See Yom-Tov et al. (2013); Flaxman et al. (2016); White and Horvitz (2015) for evidence of individual
preference for like-minded news in the context of search engines.
8As mentioned above in Section 2.1, given the assumptions on p, q and µ, a rational agent who derives utility
from reading a website reporting a correct signal (ym = ω) but who cannot use the ranking rn to update her
information about the true state of the world, prefers to ignore her signal xn and choose a website m with ym = zn.
In Section 6.3, we briefly discuss some implications of more sophisticated learning in our model.
9More generally, when faced with ordinal lists, individuals often show a disproportionate tendency to select
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distribution over the outlets that is multiplicatively separable from the ranking-free values (v∗n),
we can write final values as ranking-weighted values:
vn,m = rn,m · v∗n,m. (3)
Websites with a higher ranking receive a higher weight. In Section 6.1, we introduce a parameter
(α) that further calibrates the degree of attention bias.
Individual stochastic choice. We can think of the values vn,m defined in (3) as representing
desirability levels for the different ranked alternatives, which yields the stochastic choices defined
in (1), as in a standard random utility model, and thus give us the website choice function
ρn : {0, 1}2 ×∆(M)→ ∆(M), defined by:10
ρn,m =
rn,m · v∗n,m∑
m′∈M rn,m′ · v∗n,m′
. (4)
The website choices ρn,m reflect, through the ranking-free values (v
∗
n,m), two attributes of website
m from individual n’s perspective, namely, (i) whether website m reports a signal corresponding
to the individual’s prior (ym = xn), which gives desirability γ, and (ii) whether website m is
identified as carrying a website majority signal (ym = zn), which gives desirability 1− γ. At the
same time, website m’s rank (rn,m) re-scales its final desirability in a multiplicatively separable
way, and reflects individuals’ tendency to devote more attention to higher ranked websites.
Importantly, the multiplicative form leads individuals to trade off attributes and hence content,
when making non-degenerate stochastic choices (0 < γ < 1). When γ = 0 or γ = 1 only one of
the attributes matters.
Overall, ρn,m summarizes some intuitive properties, namely, individuals tend to choose web-
sites that are (i) higher ranked, (ii) ex-ante more informative, (iii) reflect their own prior informa-
tion; and (iv) they may also trade off content and ranking. Such a stochastic choice specification
is consistent with agents maximizing the probability of reading a website reporting a correct sig-
nal (thereby following their signal zn), while, at the same time, holding a preference for reading
like-minded news (thereby following their signal xn), and also being subject to attention bias
(thereby implicitly weighting the alternatives by the ranking rn).
options that are placed at the top (Novarese and Wilson, 2013).
10Fortunato et al. (2006) and Demange (2014a) use related models of individuals’ choices over ranked items.
10
2.4 Search Engine and Ranking Algorithm
The ranking algorithm used by the search engine is at the center of our model. At any point in
time, t = 1, 2, . . . , N , it gives a ranking rt ∈ ∆(M) of the M websites, where an element rt,m is
the probability that the individual searching at time t is directed to website m in the absence of
other factors.11
Concretely, we assume that, given an initial ranking r1 ∈ ∆(M), the ranking rt at subsequent
periods, t = 2, 3, . . . , N , is defined by,
rt,m = νrt−1,m + (1− ν)ρt−1,m, (5)
where ν ∈ (0, 1). This says that the ranking at time t, rt, is determined by the ranking of
the previous period rt−1 and partly also by the individual’s choice over websites in the previous
period ρt−1,m as defined in (4).12 Such ranking dynamic reflects the algorithm used by search
engines to update their rankings according to how “popular” a webpage is (Dean, 2013; MOZ,
2013; Vaughn, 2014).13 Accordingly, we will sometimes refer to the ranking as popularity-based
or simply popularity ranking. The weight that is put on each term depends on the parameter ν,
where for convenience we write,
(ν, 1− ν) =
(
κ
κ+ 1
,
1
κ+ 1
)
, (6)
and where in turn κ ∈ N is a persistence parameter of the ranking algorithm. The larger κ, the
more persistent the search engine’s ranking is. In Section 4, when studying asymptotic behavior,
we will let κ → ∞ as N → ∞. This ensures that the effect of any given individual’s search on
the ranking becomes vanishingly small and allows the dynamic process to converge to its unique
limit.
11For the sake of tractability, the ranking is considered as a cardinal score attached by the search engine to each
given website. As pointed out by Demange (2014b, p. 918) a ranking is meant to measure the “relative strength
of n items, meaning that the values taken by the scores matter up to a multiplicative constant”.
12See Demange (2012) for a similar specification of the popularity-ranking algorithm.
13This updating algorithm via the “popularity” of a website may be interpreted both in a strict sense (e.g.,
direct effect of the actual clicks on the website in the search result page) and in a broad sense (e.g., a website that
receives more clicks is also more likely to be more popular in other online platforms and vice versa). The relevance
of the popularity component of algorithmic rankings is further confirmed by the empirical evidence provided by
Kulshrestha et al. (2018).
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2.5 Search Environments
A search environment is an ex ante notion that fixes the ranking algorithm, information structure
and characteristics of individuals and websites, before they receive their signals and before they
perform their search. More formally, we define a search environment E as a list of variables,
E = 〈(p, q, µ); (N, γ);M ;κ〉 , (7)
where (p, q, µ) describes the information structure, (N, γ) describes the individuals, M describes
the websites, and κ describes the ranking algorithm. Given a search environment E , we refer
to an (interim) realization of E as to the tuple 〈ω; (L, (ym)m∈M) ; ((xn)n∈N ; (zn)n∈N)〉, where the
true state of the world and the signals of the websites are fixed; L denotes the set and the number
of websites with the correct signal ym = ω; individuals with signals (xn; zn) enter sequentially,
one at a time, in a random order.
We let r1 denote the initial ranking. Unless otherwise specified, we assume that r1 is interior,
that is, r1,m > 0 for all m ∈ M . For J ⊂ M , let rt,J =
∑
m∈J rt,m and ρt,J =
∑
m∈J ρt,m
denote respectively total ranking and total clicking probability at time t on all websites in J ; we
will be particularly interested in the case where J = L. We also often talk about the expected
probability of individual n accessing website m, ρ̂t,m = E[ρt,m], where the expectation is taken
over the private signals of agent n that enters to perform a search at time t ≡ n. (These expected
probabilities are discussed in more detail in Appendix A.)
3 Popularity Ranking and the Advantage of the Fewer
(AOF )
The following proposition states our first main result. It illustrates a rather general phenomenon
induced by popularity ranking, which we refer to as the advantage of the fewer (AOF ), whereby
a set of websites with the same signal can get a greater total clicking probability by individuals
sufficiently far up in the sequence, if the set contains fewer websites than if it contains more of
them (as long as it does not switch from being a set of majority to a set of minority websites).14
14Recall that, unless otherwise stated, our search environments always have popularity-based rankings (see
Section 2.4). Note also that, throughout the paper, we use the term decreasing (and increasing) in the weak
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Proposition 1. Fix a search environment E with uniform initial ranking r1, and N , κ large,
and consider interim realizations of E that vary in the number of outlets with correct signal.
Then, the clicking probability (ρN,J) by individual N on all outlets with a fixed signal, say J ,
(i.e., where m,m′ ∈ J ⊂M implies ym = ym′ and similarly for m′′,m′′′ ∈M\J) is decreasing in
the number of those outlets (#J), for “interior values” of the parameters (i.e., when 0 < γ < 1
and #J 6= 0, M−1
2
,M − 1).
This suggests that having fewer websites reporting a given signal enhances their overall traffic.
The intuition behind the AOF effect is straightforward. When there are fewer websites with a
given signal, the flow of individuals interested in reading about that signal are concentrated
on fewer outlets, thus leading to relatively more clicks per outlet. This (trivial) static effect
transforms into a dynamic, amplified one through the interaction of the popularity ranking with
individuals’ stochastic choices: popularity ranking induces relatively higher rankings for those
fewer websites, which makes them more attractive for subsequent individuals, inducing more
trade-offs in favor of those fewer higher ranked websites, leading to even more clicks, and so on.
The process, which can be seen as embodying a “few get richer” dynamic, gets repeated until it
stabilizes in the limit, generating a potentially sizable amplification of total traffic on all websites
with the given signal.15
The AOF implies that having a small majority (or a small minority) of websites rather than
a large majority (or minority) of websites reporting a given signal actually increases their overall
traffic. At the same time, the amount of traffic that such websites can attract is limited by the fact
that majority (minority) websites attract all traffic from individuals with signals xn = zn = yK
(xn = zn = yM\K). Accordingly, the results do not imply that all traffic is directed toward
a single website or group of websites, but rather that there is an amplification effect for the
traffic going to both majority or minority websites triggered by a lower number of corresponding
websites. The amplification effect generated by the AOF hinges upon two main components:
the popularity ranking and a non-degenerate stochastic choice of the individuals, who trade off
content depending on the ranking when γ is interior (0 < γ < 1). Instead, when γ = 0 or γ = 1
such an effect is absent and total traffic directed towards websites with a given signal is constant
and does not depend on the number of websites (except if J = 0, M−1
2
,M − 1).
sense, that is, we say a function f is decreasing (increasing) if x ≥ y implies f(x) ≤ f(y) (f(x) ≥ f(y)). When
x ∈ N, we say f is decreasing (increasing) at x if f(x+ 1) ≤ f(x) (f(x+ 1) ≥ f(x+ 1).
15Figure A.1 in the Online Appendix, provides a graphical illustration of the amplification effect.
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Two further remarks regarding the AOF effect are in order.
1. AOF can contribute to the understanding of the spread of misinformation, in the sense that
a signal that is carried by few outlets, for example, a controversial or “fake news” report,
may paradoxically receive amplified traffic precisely because it is carried by few outlets.16
This is consistent with various claims that the algorithms used by Google and Facebook
have apparently promoted websites reporting “fake news”.17 Indeed, even in queries with
a clear factual truth, such as yes-no questions within the medical domain, top-ranked
results of search engines provide a correct answer less than half of the time (White, 2013)..
Importantly, empirical evidence shows that websites reporting misinformation may acquire
a large relevance in terms of online traffic and in turn may affect individuals’ opinions and
behavior (Carvalho et al., 2011; Kata, 2012; Mocanu et al., 2015; Shao et al., 2016). By
the same token, “authoritative” or mainstream websites that are relatively numerous will
receive less traffic overall, the more numerous they are.
2. AOF is an intrinsic property of popularity rankings combined with the tendency of indi-
viduals to focus on higher ranked results. It can be seen as an almost mechanical property
of popularity-based rankings that holds well beyond the assumptions of our model. To
show this, the online appendix provides examples illustrating cases, where: (i) parameters
are outside the assumed range, for example, when individual signals are uninformative
(p = µ = 1/2), (ii) individuals need not distinguish between majority and minority web-
sites and simply choose based on independent cues (xn and zn) that can be interpreted as
general desirable attributes of the different websites; (iii) rankings are not stochastic but
rather a list of 1st to M th ranked outlet, as a function of traffic obtained (
∑
n′≤n ρn′), (iv)
individual choices are pure realizations of the stochastic choice functions (ρn), or (v) where
the total number of websites is not necessarily fixed, thus allowing for cases, where two or
more websites can merge and thereby reduce the number of overall websites (M).18 These
16For example, if there was a single minority “fake news” website (so that M − L = 1), then the probability
that that outlet would be visited by an individual in the limit is (assuming µ = 1 and γ not too small) ρ∞,fake =
1− γp(M−1)γM−1 . Moreover, such a “fake news” website will be the top ranked one if γ > 1M(1−p) .
17On Google’s search algorithm prioritizing websites reporting false information, see: “Harsh truths about fake
news for Facebook, Google and Twitter”, Financial Times, November 21, 2016; “Google, democracy and the
truth about internet search”, The Observer, December 4, 2016. On Facebook showing websites reporting false
information in the top list of its trending topics, see: “Three days after removing human editors, Facebook is
already trending fake news,” The Washington Post, August 29, 2016.
18One might expect that allowing for free entry would tend to weaken the AOF . However, while addressing
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examples further suggest that AOF is a potentially robust phenomenon.
4 Popularity Ranking and Asymptotic Learning
To assess the effect of the popularity ranking on opinion dynamics, we consider search envi-
ronments from an interim and an ex-ante perspective. Since our model endogenizes individual
clicking probabilities, it seems natural to evaluate efficiency in terms of asymptotic probability of
clicking on a website carrying the correct signal. We further interpret this notion of efficiency as
asymptotic learning, under the implicit assumption that individuals assimilate the content they
read.
Consider the probability of individual n choosing a website reporting a signal corresponding
to the true state of the world (ym = ω). At the interim stage, we can write this as the probability
ρn,L (=
∑
m∈L ρn,m) of individual n clicking on any website m ∈ L. We can also define a measure
of interim efficiency (PL), conditional on interim realizations, where the total number of websites
reporting the correct signal is L, as:
PL(α, γ, µ, p) = ρ∞,L = lim
N→∞
ρN,L. (8)
This implies the following measure of ex ante efficiency (P):
P(α, γ, µ, p, q) =
M∑
L=0
(
M
L
)
qL(1− q)M−LPL(α, γ, µ, p), (9)
which uses the accuracy of websites’ signals (q) to weigh the different interim levels (PL).
To better highlight the role of popularity ranking on asymptotic learning, we use as benchmark
of comparison, the case where ranking is random and uniform throughout (rn,m =
1
M
for all n,m),
which we refer to simply as random ranking.
free entry of websites and even modeling the strategic choices of websites is outside the scope of this paper, it is
worth noting that the effect of allowing free entry on the AOF may be limited, especially in those cases where
the “fewer websites” are minority websites carrying “dubious” information. Indeed, it may not be in the interest
of mainstream websites (which are likely to also care about their reputation) to report such information. Also,
new minority websites may not necessarily be able to “steal” much traffic from the existing ones due to their
lower ranking (as explained by the rich-get-richer dynamic, see Section 6.2). Hence, we believe the result may
be particularly relevant for dubious information, carried by relatively few websites and that “resonates” with a
significant fraction of individuals.
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As explained in Appendix A, we compute the limit ranking and limit clicking probabilities
using the mean dynamics approximation (Norman, 1972; Izquierdo and Izquierdo, 2013). This
involves fixing an interim search environment (essentially characterized by the number of web-
sites L carrying the correct signal) and approximating the random clicking probabilities ρn,m in
Equation (4) for m ∈M by their expectations ρ̂n,m = E[ρn,m], while letting κ→∞ as N →∞.
This leads to deterministic recursions that are easily computed in the limit by means of ordinary
differential equations. To obtain the ex ante efficiency, we take expectations over all interim
environments as specified in Equation (9).
4.1 Non-monotonicity of Interim Efficiency
Before analyzing ex-ante efficiency, we first study interim efficiency. The following result follows
from Proposition 1 and illustrates how interim efficiency is a non-monotonic function of the
number of websites carrying the correct signal (L) due to the advantage of the fewer effect
(AOF ).
Corollary 1. Fix a search environment E with uniform initial ranking r1, and consider interim
realizations of E that vary only in the number of outlets with correct signal (L). Then PL is
non-monotonic in L. In particular, when γ is interior (0 < γ < 1), then PL is increasing in L
at L = 0, M−1
2
,M − 1, but it is decreasing in L otherwise.
The non-monotonicity in L follows from three basic facts: (i) small majorities (or minorities)
of outlets with a correct signal result in higher interim efficiency (PL) than large majorities (or
minorities), resulting in a decreasing effect of L on PL induced by AOF , (ii) when L increases
from M−1
2
to M+1
2
, then interim efficiency increases, since the correct signal (yL) switches from
being a minority to being a majority signal, (iii) when L increases from 0 to 1 or from M − 1 to
M , interim efficiency obviously increases.
Figure 1 shows the non-monotonicity of interim efficiency PL in L, as stated in Corollary 1, as
well as the AOF effect as discussed in Section 3, in the presence of the popularity ranking when
the preference for like-minded news is interior (γ = 0.33), (black line, left panel), and shows that
interim efficiency is monotonic and AOF is absent when γ = 0, 1 (left panel, dashed lines) or
when the ranking is random (and therefore popularity ranking is switched off), (right panel).
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Figure 1: Interim efficiency (PL) as a function of the number of websites with correct signal (L) for γ = 0.33
(black line) and other values of γ (dashed lines) for the cases of popularity ranking (left) and random ranking
(right). In both panels, M = 20, p = 0.55, µ = 0.9, and r1 is uniform.
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Figure 2: Ex ante efficiency (P) as a function of the accuracy of websites’ signals (q) (right) with popularity-
ranking (black line) and random-ranking (red dashed). The figure also shows net ex ante efficiency (gray dashed)
with popularity-ranking. M = 20, p = 0.55, µ = 0.9, γ = 0.33 and r1 is uniform.
4.2 Ex Ante Efficiency
4.2.1 Comparative statics
Our notion of ex ante efficiency (P) is a measure of asymptotic learning that obtains in our
popularity-ranking based search environments. The following proposition describes comparative
statics of P with respect to basic parameters of the model.
Proposition 2. Let E be a search environment with a uniform initial ranking r1. Then:
1. (Individual accuracy) P is increasing in p and in µ.
2. (Website accuracy) P can be both increasing or decreasing in q.
3. (Like-mindedness) P is decreasing in γ, for p ∈ (1
2
, p
]
, for some p > 1
2
.
We briefly discuss these effects.
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1. (Individual accuracy) Higher levels of p and µ always increase interim hence also ex ante
efficiency. This is not just the consequence of the direct effect of more accurate private
signals. The direct effect is increased by the dynamic one, since more individuals receiving a
correct signal, increases the number of clicks on websites reporting that signal, which in turn
increases their ranking. This further increases the probability that subsequent individuals
will also choose websites reporting a correct signal so that, even though individuals are
assumed to be na¨ıve, the higher p and µ are, the more effective popularity ranking is
in aggregating information and creating a positive externality that enhances asymptotic
learning.
2. (Website accuracy) A higher q may increase or decrease ex ante efficiency. This is a
consequence of the non-monotonicity of the interim efficiency (Corollary 1), driven by AOF .
Higher values of q make it more likely that the number of websites with correct signal is
large. Hence, due to AOF , a higher q decreases the clicking probability on websites with
a correct signal, thus reducing ex ante efficiency for intermediate values of γ. If one could
switch off AOF , then a higher q would always increase ex-ante efficiency (i.e., efficiency
“net of AOF” is always increasing in q).19 This stark difference is illustrated in Figure 2.
3. (Like-mindeness) Given the assumption on the relative informativeness of private signals
(µq > p), if moreover, p is not too large, then a higher γ decreases the probability of
choosing a website reporting a correct signal.
4.2.2 Popularity-Ranking Effect (PoR)
We turn to the crucial question of how well popularity ranking performs in terms of asymptotic
learning. The following definition uses random ranking as a comparison benchmark.
19Specifically, one can define ex ante efficiency “net of AOF” (Pnet) as ex ante efficiency calculated with
weighted constant “average” minority and majority traffic levels, respectively, PdM4 e and Pd 3M4 e, formally:
Pnet =
M−1
2∑
k=1
PdM4 e
(
M
k
)
qk(1− q)M−k +
M−1∑
k=M+12
Pd 3M4 e
(
M
k
)
qk(1− q)M−k + qM .
While, in principle, it would be possible to correct the ranking algorithm for the AOF effect, we are unaware
of any such correction undertaken in practice, nor have we seen the effect mentioned in the computer science or
machine learning literature.
18
Definition 1. Let E be a search environment with a uniform initial ranking r1, and let E ′ be
another search environment that differs from E only in that the ranking is always an uniform
random ranking. Let P and P ′ denote ex ante efficiency of E and E ′ respectively, then we define
the popularity ranking effect of E (PoR(E)) as the difference:
PoR(E) = P − P ′.
The following result compares popularity ranking and random ranking.
Proposition 3. Let E be a search environment with uniform initial ranking r1. Then there exist
γ > 0, µ < 1, and a threshold function for q, φ : [0, 1]→ [1
2
, 1], that is decreasing in γˆ, such that
φ(γˆ) = 1, for γˆ ∈ [0, γ], and, moreover, for any threshold γˆ ∈ [γ, 1]:
1. PoR(E) ≥ 0 for γ ∈ [0, γˆ], µ ∈ [µ, 1], provided q ∈ [ p
µ
, φ(γˆ)].
2. PoR(E) ≤ 0 for γ ∈ [γ, γˆ], provided q ∈ [φ(γˆ), 1].
In other words, when preference for like minded news is sufficiently low (γ ∈ [0, γ]) and the
accuracy on the majority signal is sufficiently high (µ ∈ [µ, 1]), then popularity ranking does
better than random ranking. That is, when individual clicking behavior generates sufficiently
positive information externalities, popularity ranking aggregates information and increases the
probability of asymptotic learning relative to random ranking. Moreover, this continues to hold
for higher values of preference for like minded news (γ ∈ [γ, γˆ], for γˆ that can go up to 1), provided
the accuracy of websites is not too high (q ≤ φ(γˆ)) (due to AOF ). Put differently, due to AOF ,
an increase in the ex-ante informativeness of websites (q), may lead to a negative popularity
ranking effect.20 Figures 2 and 3 illustrate Proposition 3: popularity ranking dominates random
ranking in terms of ex-ante efficiency provided q and γ are not too large, and is dominated by
random ranking otherwise.
5 Personalized Ranking
Another important question for a ranking algorithm concerns whether it should keep track of, and
use, information it has available concerning the individuals’ identity and past searches. A search
20By contrast, ex ante efficiency “net of AOF” (Pnet) is above random ranking even for large values of q.
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Figure 3: Ex ante efficiency (P) as a function of the preference for like-minded news (γ) with popularity-ranking
(black line) and random-ranking (red dashed). The figure also shows net ex ante efficiency (gray dashed) with
popularity-ranking. The plot is drawn for M = 20, p = 0.55, µ = 0.9, q = 0.7, and r1 is uniform.
engine may want its algorithm to condition the outcomes of searches on the geographic location
of the individuals (e.g., using the individual’s IP address) or other individual characteristics (e.g.,
using the individual’s search history). Accordingly, a personalized search algorithm may output
different search results to the same query performed by individuals living in different locations
and/or with different browsing histories.21
Suppose the set of individuals N is partitioned into two nonempty groups A,B ⊂ N , such
that A ∪ B = N and A ∩ B = ∅. Suppose the two groups differ in terms of the individuals’
preference for like-minded news (γA 6= γB). In any period an individual is randomly drawn from
one of the two groups, that is, from A with probability NA
N
and from B with probability NB
N
,
where NA = #A > 0 and NB = #B > 0. A personalized ranking algorithm then consists of
two parallel rankings, namely, rAt for individuals in A and r
B
t for individuals in B. Each one is
updated as in the non-personalized case, with the difference that the weight on past choices of
individuals from the own group are possibly different than those from the other one. Set, for any
t and m, and for ` = A,B,
r`t,m = ν
`
t r
`
t−1,m + (1− ν`t )ρ`t−1,m , (10)
where ν`t now depends on whether or not the individual searching at time t− 1 was in the same
21Pariser (2011); Dean (2013); MOZ (2013); Vaughn (2014); Kliman-Silver et al. (2015). Hannak et al. (2013)
document the presence of extensive personalization of search results. In particular, while they show that the
extent of personalization varies across topics, they also point out that “politics” is the most personalized query
category. See also Xing et al. (2014) for empirical evidence on personalization based on the Booble extension of
Chrome.
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group, t− 1 ∈ `, and where the weight ν`t , for ` = A,B, is given by:
(ν`t , 1− ν`t ) =
(
κ
1− λt + κ,
1− λt
1− λt + κ
)
, where λt =
 0 if t− 1 ∈ `λ else , (11)
with κ ∈ N and λ ∈ [0, 1] parameters of the personalized ranking algorithm. This algorithm
now gives different weights to past choices over websites depending on whether these choices
were taken by individuals in the same group (weights κ
1+κ
, 1
1+κ
) or in the other group (weights
κ
1−λ+κ ,
1−λ
1−λ+κ). In particular, when λ = 1, the ranking algorithm is fully personalized, whereas,
when λ = 0, it coincides with the non-personalized one previously defined. We implicitly as-
sume that the personalized algorithm partially separates individuals according to the individual
characteristics (i.e., according to the different parameters γ). We will refer to a personalized
search environment Eλ when considering the generalization of a search environment E , defined in
Section 2.5, to the case where the ranking is described by Equations (10) and (11) with λ ≥ 0.
5.1 Belief Polarization
By introducing personalization in our model, we allow the ranking of websites to be conditioned
on (observable) characteristics of the individuals such that searches performed by individuals in
different groups can have different weights. When λ = 0, there is no difference in the ranking of
websites for the two groups, while as λ increases the groups start observing potentially different
rankings which may further trigger different website choices, thus leading to different opinions.
In other words, increased personalization may lead to increased belief polarization.
Definition 2. Fix a personalized search environment Eλ with nonempty groups of individuals A
and B. Let K denote the set of websites carrying the website-majority signal, then we define the
degree of belief polarization of Eλ as:
BP(Eλ) =
∣∣ρ̂AN,K − ρ̂BN,K∣∣ .
We say environment Eλ exhibits more belief polarization than E ′λ, if BP(Eλ) > BP(E ′λ).
Proposition 4. Let Eλ be a personalized search environment with personalization parameter λ.
Suppose there are two groups of individuals A and B of equal size, then BP(Eλ) is increasing in
21
λ.
Non-trivial personalization (λ > 0) can lead to different information held by relatively similar
groups of individuals and thus to polarization of opinions.22 This suggests that individuals might
end up into an algorithmically-driven echo chamber. This is in line with Flaxman et al. (2016),
who show that search engines can lead to a relatively high level of ideological segregation, due
to web search personalization embedded in the search engine’s algorithm and to individuals’
preference for like-minded sources of news. It is also in line with existing claims and empirical
evidence suggesting that the Internet—together with the online platforms embedded in it—
generally contributes towards increasing ideological segregation (Putnam, 2001; Sunstein, 2009;
Pariser, 2011; Halberstam and Knight, 2016; Bessi et al., 2015; Bar-Gill and Gandal, 2017).
Next, we study how personalization may actually hinder asymptotic learning.
5.2 Personalized-Ranking Effect (PeR)
We turn to the effect of personalization on ex-ante efficiency. Personalization here can be seen as
progressively “separating” two groups of individulas by uncoupling their rankings and thereby
switching off potential externalities from one group to the other. To the extent that the group
with weaker preference for like minded news exerts a positive externality on the groups’ rankings
and overall ex ante efficiency, increasing the personalization may inhibit total ex ante efficiency.
Definition 3. Let E be a non-personalized and Eλ be a personalized search environment with
personalization parameter λ, and both with a uniform initial ranking r1. Let P and Pλ denote
ex ante efficiency of E and Eλ respectively, then we can define the personalized ranking effect of
Eλ (PeR(Eλ)) as the difference:
PeR(Eλ) = Pλ − P .
Proposition 5. Eλ be a personalized search environment with personalization parameter λ, and
with a uniform initial ranking r1. Suppose there are two nonempty groups of individuals A and
B with 0 ≤ γA < γB ≤ γ. Then there exist γ > 0, µ < 1, and a decreasing function of γˆ,
φ : [0, 1]→ [1
2
, 1], such that φ(γˆ) = 1, and, moreover, for any γˆ ∈ [γ, 1]:
22Notice that, if individuals in different groups were to face also different initial rankings, (rA1 6= rB1 ), then
this different rankings would clearly contribute to further accentuating the evolution of rankings seen by the two
groups.
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1. PeR(E) ≤ 0 for γ ∈ [0, γˆ], µ ∈ [µ, 1], provided q ∈ [ p
µ
, φ(γˆ)].
2. PeR(E) ≥ 0 for γ ∈ [γ, γˆ], provided q ∈ [φ(γˆ), 1].
Although the exact cutoff values for the parameters need not coincide, the parallels between
the popularity ranking effect and the personalized ranking effect are stark. That is, when the
preference for like minded news is sufficiently low (γ ∈ [0, γ]) and the accuracy on the majority
signal is sufficiently high (µ ∈ [µ, 1]), then personalized ranking does worse than non-personalized
(popularity) ranking; moreover, this continues to hold for higher values of preference for like
minded news (γˆ ∈ [γ, 1]), provided the accuracy of websites is not too high (q ≤ φ(γˆ)) (due to
AOF ); on the other hand for the higher values of preference for like-minded news (γˆ ∈ [γ, 1])
personalized ranking will perform better than non-personalized (popularity) ranking, provided
accuracy of websites is sufficiently high (q ≥ φ(γˆ)). In other words, the forces that lead to a
positive (negative) popularity effect are similar to the ones that lead to a negative (positive)
personalization effect.
The intuition for the negative relation between the popularity ranking and the personalized
ranking effects (PoR and PeR) is due to the fact that a positive popularity ranking effect occurs
when individuals’ parameters generate positive feedback into the dynamics (high accuracy µ and
low preference for like-minded news γ); the same forces favor non-personalization and hence tend
to generate a negative personalized ranking effect. This is because personalization can be seen
as limiting the feedback between individuals in the dynamics, and so, when individuals’ signals
tend to generate positive feedback, it is better not to limit the feedback and hence it is better not
to personalize the ranking and vice versa when individuals’ signals generate negative feedback.
The similarity also with respect to the website accuracy parameter (q) is due to the AOF effect
that is present with or without personalization.
Figure 4 illustrates the negative relationship between PoR and PeR . In this case, personal-
ized ranking (green dashed) tends to be dominated (in terms of asymptotic learning) by either
non-personalized ranking (black) or by random ranking (gray dashed). The right-hand panel in-
dicates that when AOF is switched off, the corresponding “net” PeR effect tends to be negative
for any level of ex-ante accuracy of websites.
It is important to note that our searches are common value searches in the sense that all
individuals want to read outlets carrying the (same) correct signal. When individuals have
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Figure 4: Ex ante efficiency with no personalization (Pλ=0) (black) and with personalization w.r.t. γ (Pλ=1)
(green dashed); and with random ranking (gray dashed). The right panel illustrates the same for ex-ante efficiency
“net of AOF”. In both panels, M = 20, q = 0.7, p = 0.55, µ = 0.9, γ = 0.33, and r1 uniform.
private values, personalization may be an important tool that actually favors asymptotic learning
of typically multiple and distinct signals.
6 Robustness
6.1 Attention bias
In our basic model of how individuals respond to website rankings, we assumed multiplicative
separability between the ranking (rn) and the ranking-free values (v
∗
n), such that the ranking
entered directly as a weighting function for the ranking-free-values. We now generalize the
weighting function by introducing an attention bias parameter α ≥ 0, which yields the following
more general ranking-weighted values:
vn,m = (rn,m)
α · v∗n,m.
The parameter α calibrates the individual’s attention bias in the following sense: α = 1 is a
neutral benchmark in that it maintains the weight differences already present in the entries of
the ranking rn; α > 1 magnifies the differences in the entries of rn, and in particular also the ones
present in the initial ranking r1; α < 1 reduces the differences in the entries of rn; in the limit,
as α → 0, all entries have the same weight, which represents the case with no attention bias,
where all websites that provide the same signal yield the same value. Given the values vn,m, we
can write the website choice function with attention bias α ≥ 0, ρn : {0, 1}2 ×∆(M) → ∆(M),
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as
ρn,m =
(rn,m)
α · v∗n,m∑
m′∈M(rn,m′)
α · v∗n,m′
. (12)
When α = 1, this coincides with the choice function studied so far (Equation (4)). When α = 0,
it yields choices that coincide with the ranking-free choices v∗n,m, since all outlets have the same
weight (rn,m)
0 = 1. For this same reason, it is easy to see that, in terms of website choices
and hence interim and ex ante efficiency (PL and P), an environment with popularity ranking
rn,m but attention bias α = 0 is outcome-equivalent to an environment with random ranking,
regardless of what α might be in that environment.23
The AOF effect stated in Proposition 1 (for α = 1) carries over verbatim to the general case of
α ≥ 0;24 and similarly its implications for asymptotic learning or interim efficiency (Corollary 1),
as summarized by the following Corollary:
Corollary 2. Fix a search environment E with attention bias parameter α ≥ 0 and with uniform
initial ranking r1 and κ large, and consider interim realizations of E that vary only in the number
of outlets with correct signal (L). Then:
1. For α > 0, PL is non-monotonic in L.
2. For α = 0, PL is monotonically increasing in L.
In particular, when α > 0 and 0 < γ < 1, then PL is increasing in L at L = 0, L = M − 1, as
well as at L = M−1
2
, but it is decreasing in L otherwise.
In particular, this shows that AOF applies when ranking matters (α > 0) and disappears
when there is no attention bias and ranking does not matter (α = 0). Thus AOF disappears with
random ranking. In terms of comparative statics of ex ante efficiency, the results of Proposition
2 also carry over verbatim to the general case of α ≥ 0, with the only difference that, for α = 0,
P is always increasing in q, while, for α > 0, it can be both increasing or decreasing in q; again
this is because AOF kicks in when α > 0 and vanishes when α = 0.
23When there is zero attention bias (α = 0), all websites receive equal weights in the website values (vn,m)
that determine the website choice probabilities (ρn,m). Similarly, when there is random ranking (r1 and every
subsequent ranking rn is uniform, so that rn,m =
1
M regardless of the parameter α), then all websites will also
receive equal weights in the website values. Thus website choice probabilities (ρn,m) always coincide in the two
cases.
24The proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix B is directly given for the case of α ≥ 0. It is important to note that,
while, for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, the unique limit always satisfies AOF ; for α > 1, depending on the initial condition (i.e.,
the initial ranking; see also Section 6.2), there can be multiple limits, of which the asymptotically stable ones,
that is, the only ones that can be reached by our dynamic process, also always satisfy AOF .
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6.2 Non-Uniform Initial Ranking and the Rich Get Richer
Many of the propositions stated in the paper assumed a uniform initial ranking. We now study
this assumption in more detail, looking at environments with general attention bias (α ≥ 0). As
it turns out, the expected limit clicking probabilities ρ̂∞,m only depend on the initial ranking
when α > 1. In this case, there is also a “rich-get-richer” effect.
Proposition 6. Let E be a search environment with attention bias parameter α ≥ 0 and with
interim realization 〈ω; (L, (ym))〉, with interior initial ranking r1,m > 0 for all m. Then, if
attention bias satisfies 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, then the expected limit clicking probabilities ρ̂∞,m do not
depend on r1. This is not true if α > 1.
The evolution of a website’s ranking based on its “popularity,” interacted with a sufficiently
large attention bias (α > 1) exhibits a rich-get-richer dynamic, whereby the ratio of the expected
clicking probabilities of two websites m,m′, with r1,m > r1,m′ > 0 increases over time as more
agents perform their search. The effect is further magnified, the larger α is. Importantly, the
differences in the ranking probabilities (rn) and in the expected website choice probabilities (ρ̂n),
are driven by the initial ranking (r1) and are amplified by the attention bias. We define this
more formally.
Definition 4. Fix a search environment E with attention bias parameter α ≥ 0 and with interim
realization 〈ω; (L, (ym))〉. We say that E exhibits the rich-get-richer dynamic if, for two websites
m,m′ ∈ M with the same signal, ym = ym′, and different initial ranking, r1,m > r1,m′ > 0, we
also have ρ̂n,m
ρ̂n,m′
> ρ̂n−1,m
ρ̂n−1,m′
, for any n > 0.
When an environment exhibits a rich-get-richer dynamic, then the ratio of the expected
probability of two websites (with the same signal but different initial ranking) being visited not
only persists over time (this follows from κ > 0), but actually increases. We can state the
following.
Proposition 7. Let E be a search environment with attention bias parameter α ≥ 0 and with
interim realization 〈ω; (L, (ym))〉. Then we have, for any two websites m,m′ ∈M with ym = ym′
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and r1,m > r1,m′ > 0, and n > 1:
ρ̂n,m
ρ̂n,m′

<
=
>

ρ̂n−1,m
ρ̂n−1,m′

if α < 1
if α = 1
if α > 1 .
(13)
In particular, if the attention bias is large enough (α > 1), then E exhibits the rich-get-richer
dynamic.
This proposition shows that the attention bias plays a crucial role in the evolution of website
traffic. When 0 ≤ α < 1, initial conditions do not matter in the limit (as N → ∞), in the
sense that websites with the same signal will tend to be visited with the same probability in the
limit. When α = 1 the ratios of the expected clicking probabilities remain constant for websites
with the same signal. When α > 1, initial conditions matter and the evolution of website traffic
follows a rich-get-richer dynamic. Traffic concentrates on the websites that are top ranked in
the initial ranking. The rich-get-richer dynamic is in line with the “Googlearchy” suggested
by Hindman (2009), who argues that the dominance of popular websites via search engines is
likely to be self-perpetuating. Most importantly, the rich get richer pattern of website ranking
(and traffic) via search engines is consistent with established empirical evidence (Cho and Roy,
2004).25
6.3 Sophisticated Learning
The key contribution of our model is to combine endogenous ranking of websites with sequential
clicking behavior of behaviorally biased and na¨ıve individuals. As pointed out before, such a
framework reflects empirical evidence on individual preferences for confirmatory news (Gentzkow
and Shapiro, 2010) and further informational and behavioral limitations in assessing the working
of ranking algorithms (Granka, 2010; Eslami et al., 2016). This provides a setting where there is
a certain degree of learning via the ranking but where asymptotic learning is not guaranteed.26
25Indeed, even if some scholars have argued that the overall traffic induced by search engines is less concentrated
than it might appear due to the topical content of user queries (Fortunato et al., 2006), the rich-get-richer dynamic
is still present within a specific topic.
26As pointed out by Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2011), p. 6, as disagreement on many economic, social and
political issues is ubiquitous,“useful models of learning should not always predict consensus, and certainly not
the weeding out of incorrect beliefs”.
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We now sketch how relaxing such assumptions might affect asymptotic learning.
If individuals are not behaviorally biased (γ = 0), then there will not be asymptotic learning,
as individuals always click according to their signal of the website-majority signal (zn).
27 On the
other hand, if individuals are behaviorally biased (0 < γ < 1) and sophisticated (i.e., they know
the parameters of the environment, E , and can observe the evolution of the ranking, rt, t < n),
then they can compute the clicking probabilities (ρt, t < n). Hence, for sufficiently large n, they
can also compute increasingly accurate estimates of the individual signals (xt, t < n) and a fortiori
of their majority. The latter is an arbitrarily accurate signal of the true state (ω). Maintaining
our basic framework, we can capture an element of this “more sophisticated” updating by means
of a further signal zˆn, that, for sufficiently large n, can be observed or deduced with accuracy
µˆ > µq > p. For sufficiently large n, zˆn is more informative than the website majority signal zn
(accordingly, equation (2) would be defined with respect to zˆn). Figure 5 illustrates the limiting
behavior when the signal zˆn is approximate (µˆ = 0.9) (left) and when it is fully accurate (µˆ = 1)
(right). As can be seen, in both cases, when the preference for like-minded news is interior
(γ = 0.33, black line), the AOF effect continues to hold, but without the upward jump when L
goes from M−1
2
to M+1
2
, since the individuals’ website majority signal (zn), responsible for such
a jump, no longer plays a role when the signal zˆn is sufficiently accurate. Comparing Figure 5
with our benchmark case with no sophisticated updating (Figure 1, left panel), it is clear that
the largest discrepancy in terms of interim efficiency occurs when the website majority signal is
incorrect (i.e., outlets in L are a minority), in which case the na¨ıve individual’s “rational” choice
of following the ex-ante most informative signal (zn) is clearly sub-optimal.
7 Conclusions
Several decades after the introduction of the Internet and the World Wide Web, there is still
a vivid and growing popular and academic debate on the possible impact of digital platforms
on public opinion (e.g., Introna and Nissenbaum, 2000; Hargittai, 2004; Rieder, 2005; Hindman,
2009; Sunstein, 2009; Granka, 2010; Pariser, 2011; Bakshy et al., 2015; Lazer, 2015; Tufekci,
2015). Even among regulators and policymakers, misinformation online ranks high as a key
27Furthermore, if individuals are also sophisticated and can keep track of the evolution of the rankings, then
they can at best learn the actual website-majority signal (yK), which depending on the number of websites can
be a more or less accurate signal of the true state (ω).
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Figure 5: Interim efficiency (PL) with signals (zˆn) as a function of the number of websites with correct signal
(L) for γ = 0.33 (black line) and other values of γ (dashed lines) for the cases of approximate signals (µˆ = 0.9)
(left) and fully accurate signals (µˆ = 1) (right). In both panels, M = 20, p = 0.55 and r1 is uniform.
concern, leading some even to call for the direct regulation of online content (e.g., Germany and
France have recently proposed laws to combat “fake news”).28
Unfortunately, to understand and address these issues, it is not enough to just obtain access
to the algorithm code used by digital platforms, as the interplay between ranking algorithms and
individual behavior “yields patterns that are fundamentally emergent” (Lazer, 2015, p. 1090).
In this sense, the theoretical framework we develop seeks to inform and provide some formal
guidance to the above debate, by focusing on the interaction between users’ search behavior and
basic and well-established aspects of ranking algorithms (popularity and personalization). Our
results uncover a rather general property of popularity-based rankings, we call the advantage of
the fewer (AOF ) effect. Roughly speaking, it suggests that the smaller the number of websites
reporting a given information, the larger the share of traffic directed to those fewer websites.
Because dubious or particularly controversial information is often carried by a (relatively) small
number of websites, the AOF effect may help explain the spread of misinformation, since it shows
how being small in number may actually boost overall traffic to such websites. Nonetheless, we
find that popularity rankings—even with the AOF effect—can have an overall positive effect on
asymptotic learning by fostering information aggregation, as long as individuals can, on average,
provide sufficiently positive feedback to the ranking algorithm. The model further provides
insights on a controversial component of the ranking algorithm, namely personalization. While
personalized rankings can clearly be efficient for search queries on private value issues (e.g.,
where to have dinner), we find that for queries on common value issues (e.g., whether or not to
28See “How do you stop fake news? In Germany, with a law.” Washington Post, April 5 2017. “Emmanuel
Macron promises ban on fake news during elections.” The Guardian, January 3, 2018.
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vaccinate a child) they can hinder asymptotic learning besides also deepening belief polarization.
Understanding the role and effects of ranking algorithms, directly or indirectly used by billions
of individuals daily, is a top priority for understanding the functioning of our information society.
We view this paper as contributing a first step in this direction.
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APPENDIX
A Mean Dynamics Approximation
In order to evaluate the actions taken by an agent in the limit as N →∞, we use some techniques
of stochastic approximation from Norman (1972) as exposed in Izquierdo and Izquierdo (2013),
which we refer to as the mean dynamics approximation. We here give a brief outline in order to
follow our calculations and proofs, but we refer to the latter two sources for more details. The
basic idea of the approach is to use the expected increments to evaluate the long run behavior
of a dynamic process with stochastic increments. Rewrite the ranking probabilities as,
rt,m = νtrt−1,m + (1− νt)ρt−1,m
=
κt
1 + κt
rt−1,m +
1
1 + κt
ρt−1,m
= rt−1,m +
1
1 + κt
(ρt−1,m − rt−1,m)
Then, given Equation (12), for search environments with attention bias (α),
rt,m = rt−1,m +
1
1 + κt
(
(rt−1,m)α · v∗t−1,m∑
m′(rt−1,m′)
α · v∗t−1,m′
− rt−1,m
)
,
where in order to obtain sharper convergence results, we let κt and hence νt ∈ (0, 1) vary with t.
It is clear that the only stochastic term is given by the expressions v∗t−1,m. Replacing these with
their expectations yields the deterministic recursion in r̂t,m,
r̂t,m = r̂t−1,m +
1
1 + κt
(ρ̂t−1,m − r̂t−1,m) ,
where
ρ̂t−1,m = E[ρt−1,m] = pµ
(r̂t−1,m)α · v̂∗00m∑
m′(r̂t−1,m′)
α · v̂∗00m′
+ p(1− µ) (r̂t−1,m)
α · v̂∗01m∑
m′(r̂t−1,m′)
α · v̂∗01m′
+ (1− p)µ (r̂t−1,m)
α · v̂∗10m∑
m′(r̂t−1,m′)
α · v̂∗10m′
+ (1− p)(1− µ) (r̂t−1,m)
α · v̂∗11m∑
m′(r̂t−1,m′)
α · v̂∗11m′
(A.1)
is the expected clicking probability of the individual entering in period t − 1, and where the
expected ranking-free values v̂∗
00
m , v̂
∗01
m , v̂
∗10
m , v̂
∗11
m are given by the following table, for L 6= 0,M :29
29In the extreme cases, L = 0 or L = M , clearly, v̂∗
00
m = v̂
∗01
m = v̂
∗10
m = v̂
∗11
m = 0 (= 1) if m ∈ L,L = 0 or
m /∈ L,L = M (if m ∈ L,L = M or m /∈ L,L = 0).
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v̂∗
00
m v̂
∗01
m v̂
∗10
m v̂
∗11
m
m ∈ L, yL 6= yK γ/L 1/L 0 (1− γ)/L
m ∈ L, yL = yK 1/L γ/L (1− γ)/L 0
m /∈ L, yL 6= yK (1− γ)/(M − L) 0 1/(M − L) γ/(M − L)
m /∈ L, yL = yK 0 (1− γ)/(M − L) γ/(M − L) 1/(M − L)
Here v̂∗
00
m represents the expected probability of an individual choosing a websitem, contingent
on having received two correct signals xn = ω and zn = yK , when α = 0 (i.e., absent attention
bias); v̂∗
01
m represents the expected probability of an individual choosing a website m, contingent
on having received a correct signal on the state of the world, xn = ω, and an incorrect signal on the
majority, zn 6= yK , when α = 0, and analogously for v̂∗10m and v̂∗
11
m . Importantly, v̂
∗00
m , v̂
∗01
m , v̂
∗10
m ,
and v̂∗
11
m are fixed coefficients that do not vary with t. In particular, in order to apply the basic
approximation theorem we assume κt is of the order O(t) so that,
1
1+κt
→ 0 as t → ∞, and, to
guarantee smoothness and avoid boundary problems, we assume there exists  > 0 such that,
each r̂t,m ≥  for all t,m. Moreover, replacing r̂t−1,m with xm (and hence the vector r̂t−1 with the
vector x = (x1, . . . , xM)), we obtain a function g : ∆(M) → RM , defined, for m = 1, 2, . . . ,M ,
by,
gm(x) = E [ρt−1,m − rt−1,m | rt−1,m = xm for m = 1, . . . ,M ] = θm(x)− xm,
where θ : ∆(M)→ RM is defined by,
θm(x) = pµ
(xm)
α · v̂∗00m∑
m′(xm′)
α · v̂∗00m′
+ p(1− µ) (xm)
α · v̂∗01m∑
m′(xm′)
α · v̂∗01m′
+
+(1− p)µ (xm)
α · v̂∗10m∑
m′(xm′)
α · v̂∗10m′
+ (1− p)(1− µ) (xm)
α · v̂∗11m∑
m′(xm′)
α · v̂∗11m′
.
Given that the function g is smooth in x on ∆(M), it can be shown that the expected limit of
our stochastic process can be obtained by solving the ordinary differential equation x˙ = g(x). In
particular, for any given initial condition r0, there is a unique limit, and for large enough values
of κ the stochastic process rt (and hence also ρt) tends to follow the unique solution trajectory
and linger around the asymptotically stable limit point of the differential equation x˙ = g(x).
(See Izquierdo and Izquierdo (2013), results (i) and (iii) on p. 261).
B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. To avoid duplication, we prove the proposition directly for the case
of α > 0 mentioned in Section 6.1, which includes the case of α = 1, stated in Proposition 1, as
a special case.
We begin by characterizing the limit ranking probabilities using the differential equation from
Appendix A. Since the initial ranking is uniform, we have that the expected ranking probabilities
are equal for websites with the same signal, that is, r̂n,m = r̂n,m′ for any two websites m,m
′ with
ym = ym′ . Since we consider partitions of M into sets J and M\J , and ρn,J + ρn,M\J = 1, it
38
suffices to check the case J = L. To simplify notation, let x = r̂n,L = L · r̂n,m for m ∈ L be the
total expected ranking probability for the websites in L, so that 1−x is the total expected ranking
probability for the remaining websites in M \ L. Using the expressions for v̂∗00m , v̂∗
01
m , v̂
∗10
m , v̂
∗11
m
from the table in Appendix A, and assuming that 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, we have that the equations defining
the limit probabilities can be reduced to two equations of the form:
HminorityL (x;α, µ, γ, p) ≡ θminorityL (x;α, µ, γ, p)− x = 0, for 1 ≤ L ≤
M − 1
2
(B.1)
HmajorityL (y;α, µ, γ, p) ≡ θmajorityL (y;α, µ, γ, p)− y = 0, for
M − 1
2
≤ L ≤M − 1, (B.2)
where θminorityL and θ
majority
L are defined as:
θminorityL (x;α, µ, γ, p) = p(1− µ) +
pµγ
(
x
L
)α
γ
(
x
L
)α
+ (1− γ)
(
1−x
M−L
)α + (1− p)(1− µ)(1− γ) ( xL)α
(1− γ) ( xL)α + γ ( 1−xM−L)α (B.3)
and
θmajorityL (y;α, µ, γ, p) = pµ+
p(1− µ)γ ( yL)α
γ
( y
L
)α
+ (1− γ)
(
1−y
M−L
)α + (1− p)µ(1− γ) ( yL)α
(1− γ) ( yL)α + γ ( 1−yM−L)α (B.4)
It is easy to check that at x = 0 and x = 1, we have, respectively,
0 ≤ p(1− µ) = θminorityL (0;α, µ, γ, p) < θminorityL (1;α, µ, γ, p) = p+ (1− p)(1− µ) < 1,
and similarly, at y = 0 and y = 1,
0 < pµ = θmajorityL (0;α, µ, γ, p) < θ
majority
L (1;α, µ, γ, p) = p+ (1− p)µ ≤ 1.
In particular, θminorityL starts at or above the x-function at x = 0 and ends below the x-function
at x = 1. Similarly, θmajorityL starts above the y-function at y = 0 and ends below the y-function
at y = 1. In Figure B.1, we plot θmajorityL for different values of L and for α = 1 on the panel
on the left and for α = 4 on the panel on the right. For most parameter values of interest (i.e.,
while α not too large) there is a unique interior solution to both Equations (B.1) and (B.2); this
is the situation depicted on the left panel. However, in general there can be multiple solutions;
as depicted in the right panel. Importantly, the solutions of interest are the ones where the
functions θminorityL and θ
majority
L intersect the x- and y-functions from above.
30 This is because,
the process can only converge to those due to the fact that while clicking probabilities (θminorityL
or θmajorityL ) are above the respective ranking probabilities (x or y) then the ranking probabilities
will tend to increase and this will continue until the solution (at the intersection) is reached.
Similarly, when clicking probabilities are below the respective ranking probabilities, then the
ranking probabilities will tend to decrease until the solution is reached. In particular, only the
30As α→∞, the stable solutions converge to the bounds p(1− µ) and p+ (1− p)(1− µ) for θminorityL and to
p(1 − µ) and p + (1 − p)µ for θmajorityL , where both functions, θminorityL and θmajorityL , become arbitrarily flat.
Because these solutions do not depend on L, this implies that the AOF effect tends to zero in the limit. On the
other hand, the unstable solutions converge to LM , where both θ
minority
L and θ
majority
L become arbitrarily steep.
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Figure B.1: Limit clicking probability (θmajorityL ) as a function of the limit ranking probability (y) for different
values of L and for α = 1 (left) and α = 4 (right). In both panels, M = 20, µ = 0.9, γ = 0.33, p = 0.55, and r1 is
uniform.
two solutions with arrows are relevant in the panel on the right. The other interior solutions
without an arrow (where the x- and y-functions are intersected from below) are unstable and are
never reached by our dynamic process.31 The key part of the proof is to show that the (stable)
solutions x = xminorityL and y = y
majority
L to the two equations just above are decreasing in L in
the corresponding ranges. Since at the solutions we have HminorityL (x
minority
L ;α, µ, γ, p) = 0 and
HmajorityL (y
majority
L ;α, µ, γ, p) = 0, we can write the first derivatives with respect to L as:
dxminorityL
dL
= −∂H
minority
L (x
minority
L ;α, µ, γ, p)/∂L
∂HminorityL (x
minority
L ;α, γ, p)/∂x
=
∂θminorityL /∂L
1− ∂θminorityL /∂x
,
dymajorityL
dL
= −∂H
majority
L (y
majority
L ;α, µ, γ, p)/∂L
∂HmajorityL (y
majority
L ;α, γ, p)/∂y
=
∂θmajorityL /∂L
1− ∂θmajorityL /∂y
.
To see that both are negaitive, we need to check that
∂θminorityL
∂L
≤ 0, ∂θ
majority
L
∂L
≤ 0 and ∂θ
minority
L
∂x
<
1,
∂θmajorityL
∂y
< 1. Straighforward computations yield:
∂θminorityL
∂L
= −
αγ(1− γ)M
(
x(1−x)
L(M−L)
)α
L(M − L)
 pµ(
γ
(
x
L
)α
+ (1− γ)
(
1−x
M−L
)α)2 + (1− p)(1− µ)(
(1− γ) ( x
L
)α
+ γ
(
1−x
M−L
)α)2

∂θmajorityL
∂L
= −
αγ(1− γ)M
(
y(1−y)
L(M−L)
)α
L(M − L)
 p(1− µ)(
γ
( y
L
)α
+ (1− γ)
(
1−y
M−L
)α)2 + (1− p)µ(
(1− γ) ( x
L
)α
+ γ
(
1−y
M−L
)α)2
 ,
which are both clearly non-positive always, and negative for interior values α > 0 and 0 < γ < 1
31Even if the process were to start at such a solution, any extra click by an individual will move the ranking
probability to the left (or to the right) thereby leading to a situation where the clicking probability is below the
ranking probability, leading the ranking probability to decrease and move further to the left, again until a stable
solution with an arrow is reached (or similarly, if the extra click increases the ranking probability, this will lead
to a situation where the clicking probability is above the ranking probability, leading the ranking probability to
increase and move further right until it also reaches a stable solution with an arrow).
40
and 0 < x < 1. Also,
∂θminorityL
∂x
=
αγ(1− γ)
(
x(1−x)
L(M−L)
)α
x(1− x)
 pµ(
γ
(
x
L
)α
+ (1− γ)
(
1−x
M−L
)α)2 + (1− p)(1− µ)(
(1− γ) ( x
L
)α
+ γ
(
1−x
M−L
)α)2

∂θmajorityL
∂y
=
αγ(1− γ)
(
y(1−y)
L(M−L)
)α
y(1− y)
 p(1− µ)(
γ
( y
L
)α
+ (1− γ)
(
1−y
M−L
)α)2 + (1− p)µ(
(1− γ) ( y
L
)α
+ γ
(
1−y
M−L
)α)2
 .
Clearly these derivatives are all non-negative. However, we now show that they are strictly less
than one or the stable solutions. First, it can be checked that, for any limit clicking probability
(0 ≤ x (or y) ≤ 1) and for any other parameter values of the model,
0 ≤ γ
(
x
L
)α
γ
(
x
L
)α
+ (1− γ)
(
1−x
M−L
)α , (1− γ)
(
1−x
M−L
)α
γ
(
x
L
)α
+ (1− γ)
(
1−x
M−L
)α , γ(1− γ)
(
x(1−x)
L(M−L)
)α
(
(1− γ) ( xL)α + γ ( 1−xM−L)α)2 ≤ 1,
which, as already seen in Figure B.1 above, implies that for values of α ≥ 1 there may be more
than one solution to Equations (B.1) and (B.2). Moreover, some of the solutions may have a
slope greater or equal to one. However, as explained above, only those solutions are stable which
intersect the functions x (or y) from above. Since both x and y clearly have slope equal to 1
everywhere this implies that both θminorityL and θ
majority
L must have a slope less than one at the
stable solutions and hence must satisfy
∂θminorityL
∂x
< 1 and
∂θmajorityL
∂y
< 1. This then implies that
the respective solutions xminorityL and y
majority
L will satisfy
∂r̂N,L
∂L
≤ 0 as well as ∂ρ̂N,L
∂L
≤ 0 on the
relevant ranges and for N sufficiently large, which will also be negative for interior values of the
parameters. This shows AOF for both minority and majority outlets with correct signal. To
see that AOF also applies to outlets J ⊂ M with incorrect signal, notice that, if increasing L,
decreases ρ̂N,L, then, since the total number of outlets M is fixed and ρ̂N,L + ρ̂N,M\L = 1, this
readily implies that decreasing M − L, increases ρ̂N,M\L. Therefore, given the AOF for outlets
L with the correct signal and taking J = M\L also shows that AOF applies to minority and
majority outlets with incorrect signal. This concludes the proof of Proposition 1. 
Proof of Corollaries 1 and 2. Again, to avoid duplication, we prove directly Corollary 2
stated in Section 6.1, which includes the case of α = 1, stated in Corollary 1, as a special case.
Consider Equation (12). Then, when α = 0 it is easy to see that:
ρN,L =

0 if L = 0
(1− µ)p+ (1− µ)(1− p)(1− γ) + µpγ if 1 ≤ L = M−12
µp+ µ(1− p)(1− γ) + (1− µ)pγ if M+12 ≤ L ≤M − 1
1 if L = M ,
which can be checked is monotonically increasing in L for µ ≥ 1
2
. Now suppose α > 0. To see
the non-monotonicity, notice again that at L = 0, we have ρn,L = 0, and at L = M − 1, we
have ρn,L = 1, for all n, so that ρn,L can only increase at L = 0,M − 1. For the case L = M−12 ,
(M − L = M+1
2
) note that the difference θmajorityM+1
2
(y;α, µ, γ, p) − θminorityM−1
2
(x;α, µ, γ, p) can be
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written as:
θmajorityM−L − θminorityL =(2µ− 1)
p
1− γ ( xL )α
γ
(
x
L
)α
+ (1− γ)
(
1−x
M−L
)α
+ (1− p) (1− γ) ( xL )α
(1− γ) ( x
L
)α
+ γ
(
1−x
M−L
)α

+ p(1− µ)
 γ
(
y
M−L
)α
γ
(
y
M−L
)α
+ (1− γ)
(
1−y
L
)α − γ ( xL )α
γ
(
x
L
)α
+ (1− γ)
(
1−x
M−L
)α

+ (1− p)µ
 (1− γ)
(
y
M−L
)α
(1− γ)
(
y
M−L
)α
+ γ
(
1−y
L
)α − (1− γ) ( xL )α
(1− γ) ( x
L
)α
+ γ
(
1−x
M−L
)α
 ,
where, at the relevant solutions, x = xmajorityL and y = y
majority
M−L , we have y ≥ x, such that the
expressions in the second and third lines are both non-negative. And since µ > p
q
> 1
2
, the
overall difference (θmajorityM−L − θminorityL ) is non-negative. In all other cases, that is, interior values
L 6= 0, M−1
2
,M − 1, ρN,L is decreasing in L by Proposition 1, for sufficiently large N , and hence
also in the limit, for ρ∞,L = PL. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Also here, to avoid duplication, we prove the proposition directly
for the case of α ≥ 0 mentioned in Section 6.1, which includes the case of α = 1, stated in
Proposition 2, as a special case.
From the definition of P in Equation (9), we have:
∂P
∂z
=
M∑
L=0
(
M
L
)
qL(1− q)M−L∂PL
∂z
,
for any given variable z. Hence, we can evaluate the comparative statics by looking at the effects
on the interim efficiency, (∂PL
∂z
). So to see that P is weakly increasing in p, since the initial
ranking is uniform, we can use the same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 1. In particular,
it suffices to consider the following derivatives for θminorityL and θ
majority
L defined respectively in
Equations (B.3) and (B.4) above:
∂θminorityL
∂p
= (1− µ)
1− (1− γ) ( xL )α
γ
(
1−x
M−L
)α
+ (1− γ) ( x
L
)α
+ µ γ ( xL )α
γ
(
x
L
)α
+ (1− γ)
(
1−x
M−L
)α ≥ 0 ,
∂θmajorityL
∂p
= µ
1− (1− γ) ( yL )α
γ
(
1−y
M−L
)α
+ (1− γ) ( x
L
)α
+ (1− µ) γ ( yL )α
γ
( y
L
)α
+ (1− γ)
(
1−y
M−L
)α ≥ 0 .
This implies that ρ∞,L = PL is increasing in p for all values of L and hence so is P . To see that
P is increasing in µ, notice that:
∂θminorityL
∂µ
= −p
1− γ ( xL )α
γ
(
x
L
)α
+ (1− γ)
(
1−x
M−L
)α
− (1− p) (1− γ) ( xL )α
γ
(
1−x
M−L
)α
+ (1− γ) ( x
L
)α ≤ 0 ,
∂θmajorityL
∂µ
= p
1− γ ( yL )α
γ
( y
L
)α
+ (1− γ)
(
1−y
M−L
)α
+ (1− p) (1− γ) ( yL )α
γ
(
1−y
M−L
)α
+ (1− γ) ( y
L
)α ≥ 0 .
It can be further checked that for µq > p > 1
2
, the positive effect of when the websites in L
form a majority outweighs the negative effect of when they form a minority. To see this, we can
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rewrite the above derivatives as:
∂θminorityL
∂µ
= −θminorityL|µ=1 + θ
minority
L|µ=0 ,
∂θmajorityL
∂µ
= θmajorityL|µ=1 − θ
majority
L|µ=0 .
Moreover, it can be checked that, at the relevant solutions x = xminorityL and y = y
majority
M−L , taking
again as the relevant number of outlets with correct signal, L and M − L for the minority and
majority case respectively, we have,
θmajorityM−L|µ=1(y)− θ
minority
L|µ=1 (x) ≥ 0, θ
majority
M−L|µ=0(y)− θ
minority
L|µ=0 (x) ≤ 0.
Together with the above equations, we can obtain the sign of ∂P
∂µ
from:
M−1
2∑
L=1
(M
L
)
qL(1− q)M−L ∂θ
minority
L
∂µ
+
M−1∑
L=M+1
2
(M
L
)
qL(1− q)M−L ∂θ
majority
L
∂µ
=
M−1
2∑
L=1
(M
L
)
qL(1− q)M−L(−θminority
L|µ=1 + θ
minority
L|µ=0 ) +
M−1∑
L=M+1
2
(M
L
)
qL(1− q)M−L(θmajority
L|µ=1 − θ
majority
L|µ=0 )
=
M−1
2∑
L=1
(M
L
)
qL(1− q)M−L(−θminority
L|µ=1 + θ
minority
L|µ=0 ) +
M−1
2∑
L=1
( M
M − L
)
qM−L(1− q)L(θmajority
M−L|µ=1 − θ
majority
M−L|µ=0 )
≥
M−1
2∑
L=1
(M
L
)
qL(1− q)M−L
(
(θmajority
M−L|µ=1 − θ
minority
L|µ=1 )− (θ
majority
M−L|µ=0 − θ
minority
L|µ=0 )
)
≥ 0,
for 1
2
< p < q, which in turn implies that ∂P
∂µ
≥ 0.
To see point 3. that P is decreasing in γ, provided p not too large, µ not too small, notice that:
∂θminorityL
∂γ
=
pµ
(
x(1−x)
L(M−L)
)α
(
γ
(
x
L
)α
+ (1− γ)
(
1−x
M−L
)α)2 − (1− p)(1− µ)
(
x(1−x)
L(M−L)
)α
(
(1− γ) ( xL)α + γ ( 1−xM−L)α)2 ≥ 0 ,
∂θmajorityL
∂γ
=−
(1− p)µ
(
y(1−y)
L(M−L)
)α
(
(1− γ) ( yL)α + γ ( 1−yM−L)α)2 +
p(1− µ)
(
y(1−y)
L(M−L)
)α
(
γ
( y
L
)α
+ (1− γ)
(
1−y
M−L
)α)2 ≤ 0 .
It can be checked that when p = 1
2
, the sum of the solution to Equation (B.3) at L and the
solution to Equation (B.4) at M −L sum to one. Thus, if x = xminorityL solves Equation (B.3) at
L, then ymajorityM−L = 1− xminorityL solves Equation (B.4) at M − L. This then implies that, again
at p ≈ 1
2
,
∂θmajorityM−L
∂γ
∣∣∣∣∣
1−x
≈ −
(1− p)µ
(
x(1−x)
L(M−L)
)α
(
γ
(
x
L
)α
+ (1− γ)
(
1−x
M−L
)α)2 + p(1− µ)
(
x(1−x)
L(M−L)
)α
(
(1− γ) ( xL)α + γ ( 1−xM−L)α)2 = −
∂θminorityL
∂γ
∣∣∣∣∣
x
.
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Summing these up, yields as the total effect on ex ante efficiency,
M−1
2∑
L=1
(
M
L
)
qL(1− q)M−L∂θ
minority
L
∂γ
−
M−1
2∑
L=1
(
M
M − L
)
qM−L(1− q)L∂θ
minority
L
∂γ
=
M−1
2∑
L=1
(
M
L
)(
qL(1− q)M−L − qM−L(1− q)L) ∂θminorityL
∂γ
≤ 0,
since q > 1
2
, which in turn implies that ∂P
∂γ
≤ 0. But because there are always cases M+1
2
≤
L ≤M − 1, where solutions to Equation (B.4) are interior,32 implying ∂θ
majority
L
∂γ
< 0 for some L,
summing up actually implies that ∂P
∂γ
< 0. This in turn allows us to extend the decreasing effect
of γ on P to a neighborhood [µ, 1]× [1
2
, p], for some µ < 1, p > 1
2
, that exist given the continuity
(in fact, linearity) of the derivatives
∂θminorityL
∂γ
and
∂θmajorityL
∂γ
in both µ and p.
The fact that P is both increasing and decreasing in q is easy to check by means of examples.
As illustrated in Figure 2, P is increasing (decreasing) in q for low (high) values of q. 
Proof of Proposition 3 Assume first that µ = 1. Using the proof of Proposition 1, it can be
checked that, for α = 0, the solutions to Equations (B.3) and (B.4) take the form, respectively,
xminorityL|α=0 = γp, y
majority
L|α=0 = 1− γ(1− p), whereas, for α = 1, they take the form:
xminorityL|α=1 =
{
(1−γ)L−γp(M−L)
γM−L if L <
γpM
1−(1−γ)p
0 if L ≥ γpM1−(1−γ)p
, ymajorityL|α=1 =
{
1 if L ≤ (1−γ)M1−γp
γpL
L−(1−γ)M if L >
(1−γ)M
1−γp
.
It is easy to see that there exists γ (= 1
p+(1−p)M ) > 0 such that, for γ ∈ [0, γ], the solution for
α = 1 is always ymajorityL|α=1 = 1, for
M+1
2
≤ L ≤ M − 1, which is greater than the corresponding
solution for α = 0, (ymajorityL|α=0 = 1 − γ(1 − p)), for any M+12 ≤ L ≤ M − 1. For γ ∈ [0, γ], the
corresponding difference between the solutions xminorityL|α=1 and x
minority
L|α=0 is bounded below by −γp.
Recall that the solutions coincide with our interim notion of efficiency for the given number of
outlets with correct signal, L, so that from the definition of P in Equation (9), we can write:
P ′ = 0 +
M−1
2∑
L=1
(
M
L
)
qL(1− q)M−LxminorityL|α=0 +
M−1∑
L=M+1
2
(
M
L
)
qL(1− q)M−LymajorityL|α=0 + qM ,
P = 0 +
M−1
2∑
L=1
(
M
L
)
qL(1− q)M−LxminorityL|α=1 +
M−1∑
L=M+1
2
(
M
L
)
qL(1− q)M−LymajorityL|α=1 + qM ,
Since q  p > 1
2
, this is enough to imply that, for arbitrarily large q, while γ ∈ [0, γ], we have,
P ≥ P ′ and hence PoR≥ 0.
Suppose now γ ≥ γ. Again, for the given γ, there are two parts to the solution ymajorityL|α=1 for α = 1,
32For example, solutions always satisfy 1− µ < xminorityL , ymajorityL < µ, and are interior whenever µ 6= 1.
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Figure B.2: Interim efficiency (PL,P ′L) for α = 0 (black) and α = 1 (red dashed) as a function of L for µ = 1
(left) and µ = 0.9 (right). In both panels, M = 20, γ = 0.33, p = 0.55, and r1 is uniform. The left panel also
shows the density function for the binomial distribution for q = 0.7 < φ(γ) (light gray dashed) at which PoR> 0,
while the right panel shows the density function for the binomial distribution for q = 0.9 > φ(γ) at which PoR< 0.
namely, a part which is 1 and therefore above the solution for α = 0 (for M+1
2
≤ L ≤ (1−γ)M
1−γp )
and a part which is below the solution for α = 0 (for (1−γ)M
1−γp < L ≤M − 1). In particular, there
exists a level q such that, when q ≤ q, then the cases where L ≤ (1−γ)M
1−γp and hence where the
solution ymajorityL|α=1 for α = 1 is above the solution y
majority
L|α=0 for α = 0 will obtain sufficiently large
weight, such that ex ante efficiency for α = 1 (P) is greater or equal to ex ante efficiency for
α = 0 (P ′), that is, such that PoR≥ 0. At the same time, when q > q , then the cases where
L > (1−γ)M
1−γp and hence where the solution y
majority
L|α=1 for α = 1 is below the solution y
majority
L|α=0 for
α = 0 will obtain sufficiently large weight, such that ex ante efficiency for α = 1 (P) is less or
equal to ex ante efficiency for α = 0 (P ′), that is, such that PoR≤ 0. This gives the function
φ, which is equal to 1 on [0, γ] and which is decreasing in γ on [γ, 1], since the set of interim
realizations, where the solution ymajorityL|α=1 for α = 1 is above the solution y
majority
L|α=0 , is determined
by the cutoff (1−γ)M
1−γp , which is decreasing in γ. See Figure B.2 (left panel) for an illustration of
the case with µ = 1.
Finally, the fact that there exists µ < 1, such that the above holds for µ ∈ [µ, 1], follows essentially
from the fact that the functions θminorityL and θ
majority
L defining the Equations (B.3) and (B.4) are
linear in µ. This implies that the solutions are arbitrarily close to the ones computed for µ = 1.
More specifically, it can be checked that, for general µ, the solutions to Equations (B.3) and (B.4)
for α = 0 take the form, xminorityL|α=0 = (1− µ)(1− γ) + γp, ymajorityL|α=0 = µ(1− γ) + γp). At the same
time, while the solutions for α = 1 no longer have a simple closed form, it can be checked that,
for given L, they are above the corresponding solutions for α = 0, for L < ((1−µ)(1−γ)+γp)M ,
if L is minority, and for L < (µ(1− γ) + γp)M , if L is majority. Again, checking for the levels of
ex ante efficiency, this allows to compute decreasing cutoff levels for q as a function of γ, q, such
that for q ≥ q, PoR≤ 0, (provided γ is not too small), while for q ≥ q, PoR≥ 0. See Figure B.2
(right panel) for an illustration of the case with µ < 1. 
Proof of Proposition 4. For simplicity, we consider the case, where one half of the population
has γA and the other half has γB, and where γA 6= γB. Recall the equation defining the ranking
probabilities in the case of personalization (Equations (10) and (11)), for any t and m, and for
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` = A,B:
r`t,m = ν
`
t r
`
t−1,m + (1− ν`t )ρ`t−1,m ,
where:
(ν`t , 1− ν`t ) =
(
κ
1− λt + κ,
1− λt
1− λt + κ
)
and where λt =
{
0 if t− 1 ∈ `
λ else .
We can apply the mean dynamics approximation and obtain the deterministic recursions:
r̂At,m = r̂
A
t−1,m +
1
1 + κt
(
ρ̂At−1,m − r̂At−1,m
)
+
1− λ
1− λ+ κt
(
ρ̂Bt−1,m − r̂At−1,m
)
r̂Bt,m = r̂
B
t−1,m +
1
1 + κt
(
ρ̂Bt−1,m − r̂Bt−1,m
)
+
1− λ
1− λ+ κt
(
ρ̂At−1,m − r̂Bt−1,m
)
, (B.5)
where, following Equation (A.1), we can write, for ` = A,B:
ρ̂`t−1,m = E[ρ`t−1,m] = pµ
(r̂`t−1,m)
α · v̂∗00m (γ`)∑
m′(r̂
`
t−1,m′)α · v̂∗
00
m′(γ`)
+ p(1− µ) (r̂
`
t−1,m)
α · v̂∗01m (γ`)∑
m′(r̂
`
t−1,m′)α · v̂∗
01
m′(γ`)
+ (1− p)µ (r̂
`
t−1,m)
α · v̂∗10m (γ`)∑
m′(r̂
`
t−1,m′)α · v̂∗
10
m′(γ`)
+ (1− p)(1− µ) (r̂
`
t−1,m)
α · v̂∗11m (γ`)∑
m′(r̂
`
t−1,m′)α · v̂∗
11
m′(γ`)
.
Taking the limit κt → ∞ in the equation system (B.5), yields the equations determining the
limit clicking probabilities with personalization, which take the form:
1
2− λρ̂
A
t,m +
1− λ
2− λρ̂
B
t,m − rAt,m = 0 and
1
2− λρ̂
B
t,m +
1− λ
2− λρ̂
A
t,m − rBt,m = 0.
Replacing r̂At−1 with x = (x1, . . . , xM) and replacing r̂
B
t−1 with y = (y1, . . . , yM), we can study the
function g : ∆(M)×∆(M)→ R2M , defined, for ` = A,B, m = 1, . . . ,M , by:
gAm(x, y) = θ
A
m(x, y)− xm and gBm(x, y) = θBm(x, y)− ym
where θ` : ∆(M)×∆(M)→ RM , ` = A,B, is defined by,
θAm(x, y) =
1
2− λ
(
pµ · (xm)α · v̂∗00m (γA)∑
m′ (xm′ )
α · v̂∗00m′ (γA)
+
p(1− µ) · (xm)α · v̂∗01m (γA)∑
m′ (xm′ )
α · v̂∗01m′ (γA)
+
(1− p)µ · (xm)α · v̂∗10m (γA)∑
m′ (xm′ )
α · v̂∗10m′ (γA)
+
(1− p)(1− µ) · (xm)α · v̂∗11m (γA)∑
m′ (xm′ )
α · v̂∗11m′ (γA)
)
+
1− λ
2− λ
(
pµ · (ym)α · v̂∗00m (γB)∑
m′ (ym′ )
α · v̂∗00m′ (γB)
+
p(1− µ) · (ym)α · v̂∗01m (γB)∑
m′ (ym′ )
α · v̂∗01m′ (γB)
+
(1− p)µ · (ym)α · v̂∗10m (γB)∑
m′ (ym′ )
α · v̂∗10m′ (γB)
+
(1− p)(1− µ) · (ym)α · v̂∗11m (γB)∑
m′ (ym′ )
α · v̂∗11m′ (γB)
)
,
θBm(x, y) =
1− λ
2− λ
(
pµ · (xm)α · v̂∗00m (γA)∑
m′ (xm′ )
α · v̂∗00m′ (γA)
+
p(1− µ) · (xm)α · v̂∗01m (γA)∑
m′ (xm′ )
α · v̂∗01m′ (γA)
+
(1− p)µ · (xm)α · v̂∗10m (γA)∑
m′ (xm′ )
α · v̂∗10m′ (γA)
+
(1− p)(1− µ) · (xm)α · v̂∗11m (γA)∑
m′ (xm′ )
α · v̂∗11m′ (γA)
)
+
1
2− λ
(
pµ · (ym)α · v̂∗00m (γB)∑
m′ (ym′ )
α · v̂∗00m′ (γB)
+
p(1− µ) · (ym)α · v̂∗01m (γB)∑
m′ (ym′ )
α · v̂∗01m′ (γB)
+
(1− p)µ · (ym)α · v̂∗10m (γB)∑
m′ (ym′ )
α · v̂∗10m′ (γB)
+
(1− p)(1− µ) · (ym)α · v̂∗11m (γB)∑
m′ (ym′ )
α · v̂∗11m′ (γB)
)
.
Given that the function g is smooth in x, y on ∆(M)
2, it can be shown that the expected limit
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of our stochastic process can be obtained by solving the system of ordinary differential equations
(x˙, y˙) = g(x, y) (or (x˙, y˙) = (gA(x, y), gB(x, y))) as done above in the case of λ = 0. We have that
if λ = 0, then it is as if there were a single group with the same (common) ranking algorithm
and where the individuals’ preference for like-minded news is γ = γA+γB
2
. As λ increases, then
the rankings of the two groups drift apart and it is as if group A had parameter 1
2−λγA +
1−λ
2−λγB
and group B had parameter 1−λ
2−λγA +
1
2−λγB until, when λ = 1, it is as if there were two separate
rankings of two groups with accuracy γA and γB respectively. Since γA 6= pB the difference
in the levels of preference for like-minded news of the two groups ( λ
2−λ(γA − γB)) is increasing
in λ. Finally, since clicking and ranking probabilities coincide in the limit, this translates to
increasingly different probabilities of clicking on any given majority website in the two groups
and hence, given the definition of BP , also to a measure BP(Eλ) that is increasing in λ. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Let Pλ and PλL denote respectively ex ante and interim efficiency
as a function of the personalization parameter λ. Because the initial ranking is uniform we
can look again at the solutions to the Equations (B.3) and (B.4) in the proof of Proposition 1,
where we recall again that xminorityL = ρ̂∞,L = PλL when websites in L have minority signal
and ymajorityL = ρ̂∞,L = PλL when they have majority signal. Hence to show that Pλ is weakly
decreasing in λ we can use these solutions to study the interim efficiency levels PλL for λ ∈ [0, 1]
and 1 < L < M . As in the proof of Proposition 3, we have that, for α = 1 and µ = 1, the
solutions to Equations (B.3) and (B.4) take the form, respectively:
xminorityL =
{
(1−γ)L−γp(M−L)
γM−L if L <
γpM
1−(1−γ)p
0 if L ≥ γpM1−(1−γ)p
, ymajorityL =
{
1 if L ≤ (1−γ)M1−γp
γpL
L−(1−γ)M if L >
(1−γ)M
1−γp
.
Fix a realization of E , say, parametrized by L. From the proof of Proposition 4, we have that
when λ = 0, it is as if there were a single group with a common ranking algorithm, with
γ = γA+γB
2
. As λ increases, then the rankings of the two groups drift apart and are as if group
A had preference for like-minded news 1
2−λγA +
1−λ
2−λγB and group B had
1−λ
2−λγA +
1
2−λγB, until,
when λ = 1, it is as if there were two separate rankings of two groups with accuracy γA and γB,
respectively. As a result interim efficiency can be written as the average of the interim efficiency
of two groups, one with γλA =
1
2−λγA +
1−λ
2−λγB and another with γ
λ
B =
1−λ
2−λγA +
1
2−λγB. Therefore,
in the case of intermediate values of λ interim efficiency can be seen as the average of two levels
of interim efficiency corresponding to two different signal accuracies that are increasingly apart
as λ increases (that is, go from both signals corresponding to γA+γB
2
when λ = 0 to being γA
and γB respectively when λ = 1). Since we can always take γA, γB to be, respectively, γ
λ
A, γ
λ
B, it
suffices to consider directly the case of λ = 1. In this case, the interim efficiency levels can be
computed from the solutions evaluated at the corresponding levels of γ:
Pλ=0L =
(
xminorityL
(
γA + γB
2
)
, ymajorityL
(
γA + γB
2
))
,
for the non-personalized case (λ = 0), and from:
Pλ=1L =
(
xminorityL (γA) + x
minority
L (γB)
2
,
ymajorityL (γA) + y
majority
L (γB)
2
)
,
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Figure B.3: Interim efficiency with no personalization Pλ=0L (black) and with full personalization Pλ=1L (green
dashed) as a function of L for µ = 1 (left) and µ = 0.9 (right). In both panels, M = 20, γA = 0, γB = 0.66,
p = 0.55, and r1 is uniform. Both panels also show (gray dashed) the function
L
M as comparison benchmark as
well as the density function for the binomial distribution for q = 0.7 < φ(γ) at which PeR> 0.
for the fully personalized case (λ = 1). Since the reasoning is very similar to that of the proof
of Proposition 3, we focus on the case where the outlets with correct signal are a majority. For
λ = 0 we have, as the level of interim efficiency, directly ymajorityL
(
γA+γB
2
)
from above, while for
λ = 1, recalling 0 ≤ γA < γB ≤ 1, and since the cutoff for L ( γpM1−(1−γ)p) is decreasing in γ, we can
write this as:
ymajorityL (γA) + y
majority
L (γB)
2
=

1 if M+12 ≤ L ≤ (1−γB)M1−γBp
1
2 +
γBpL
2(L−(1−γB)M) if
(1−γB)M
1−γBp < L ≤
(1−γA)M
1−γAp
γApL
2(L−(1−γA)M) +
γBpL
2(L−(1−γB)M if
(1−γA)M
1−γAp < L ≤M − 1
.
Tedious calculations show that, when ymajorityL
(
γA+γB
2
) ≥ L
M
, we also have:
ymajorityL
(
γA + γB
2
)
≥ y
majority
L (γA) + y
majority
L (γB)
2
,
and hence Pλ=0L ≥ Pλ=1L .33 Using the same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 3, we can
show that y (or also x) ≥ L
M
occurs, when µ is sufficiently large and γ sufficiently small, and
when q is below a given threshold q(γ). It can further be shown that the reverse inequality holds
for the same values of µ and γ if q is above the threshold q(γ). Finally, a similar argument as in
the proof of Proposition 3 allows to extend to the case where µ > µ for some µ < 1. Figure B.3
illustrates the cases µ = 1 (left panel) and µ < 1 (right panel). 
Proof of Corollary 2. This is proved above together with Corollary 1. 
Proof of Proposition 6 and Proposition 7. We prove directly the case with γ ≥ 0. The
33To get more intuition for the proof, notice that Pλ=0L for majority values of L is a concave function of γ,
when solutions satisfy y ≥ LM , and becomes convex when y ≤ LM . Interim efficiency being concave implies ex ante
efficiency is concave in γ such that ex ante efficiency of an average γ = γA+γB2 will be above the average ex ante
efficiency of γA and γB (which in turn implies PeR ≤ 0, provided q < q). On the other hand, the opposite holds
(PeR ≥ 0), when the function becomes convex. This shows why larger levels of q (> q) can reverse the result.
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expected ranking probabilities are then given by:
r̂n,m = νr̂n−1,m + (1− ν)ρ̂n−1,m
= νr̂n−1,m + (1− ν)
(
pµ(r̂t−1,m)α · v̂∗00m∑
m′(r̂t−1,m′)
α · v̂∗00m′
+
p(1− µ)(r̂t−1,m)α · v̂∗01m∑
m′(r̂t−1,m′)
α · v̂∗01m′
+
+
(1− p)µ(r̂t−1,m)α · v̂∗10m∑
m′(r̂t−1,m′)
α · v̂∗10m′
+
(1− p)(1− µ)(r̂t−1,m)α · v̂∗11m∑
m′(r̂t−1,m′)
α · v̂∗11m′
)
= νr̂n−1,m + (1− ν)
(
pµ · v̂∗00m∑
m′(r̂t−1,m′)
α · v̂∗00m′
+ . . .+
(1− p)(1− µ) · v̂∗11m∑
m′(r̂t−1,m′)
α · v̂∗11m′
)
· (r̂n−1,m)α ,
where v̂∗
00
m , v̂
∗01
m , v̂
∗10
m and v̂
∗11
m are defined in Appendix A. Let m,m
′ ∈ K with m 6= m′ and
r1,m > r1,m′ > 0. Fix n > 1, we first show that the rich-get-richer dynamic applies to the ranking
probabilities. To simplify notation, let x ≡ r̂n−1,m and y ≡ r̂n−1,m′ . Because 0 < ν < 1 we always
have x > y > 0 for any n > 2, and because the two websites have the same signal they also have
the equal coefficients on (r̂n−1,m)α and r̂n−1,m, say, a and b respectively, where a, b > 0. Hence
we can write:
r̂n,m = ax
α + bx and r̂n,m′ = ay
α + by.
But then it follows that:
r̂n,m
r̂n,m′
>
r̂n−1,m
r̂n−1,m′
⇐⇒ ax
α + bx
ayα + by
>
x
y
⇐⇒ axαy + bxy > axyα + bxy ⇐⇒
(
x
y
)α
>
x
y
⇐⇒ α > 1
and similarly
r̂n,m
r̂n,m′
(=)
<
r̂n−1,m
r̂n−1,m′
⇐⇒ ax
α + bx
ayα + by
(=)
<
x
y
⇐⇒ axαy+bxy (=)< axyα+bxy ⇐⇒
(
x
y
)α
(=)
<
x
y
⇐⇒ α (=)< 1
Finally, to see the claim, notice that ρ̂n,m =
a
1−ν (r̂n,m)
α and ρ̂n,m′ =
a
1−ν (r̂n,m′)
α, where again
a
1−ν > 0, so that:
ρ̂n,m
ρ̂n,m′
>
ρ̂n−1,m
ρ̂n−1,m′
⇐⇒
a
1−ν (r̂n,m)
α
a
1−ν (r̂n,m′)
α
>
a
1−ν (r̂n−1,m)
α
a
1−ν (r̂n−1,m′)
α
⇐⇒
(
r̂n,m
r̂n,m′
)α
>
(
r̂n−1,m
r̂n−1,m′
)α
⇐⇒ r̂n,m
r̂n,m′
>
r̂n−1,m
r̂n−1,m′
⇐⇒ α > 1,
and correspondingly for α < 1 and α = 1. 
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ONLINE APPENDIX
The Online Appendix presents examples that provide numerical and graphical illustrations of
some results or of extensions of results presented in the paper.
A. Advantage of the Fewer (AOF )
First, we provide a numerical illustration of the amplification effect generated by the AOF .
Then, we show that the AOF effect is a rather general phenomenon that holds even outside the
assumptions of the model. In particular, we consider three cases not covered by the basic model
studied in the paper, namely, (1) a case with uninformative signals, (2) a case where the ranking
is an ordinal ranked list and not a probability distribution over the outlets, (3) a case where
the total number of outlets is not fixed such that, for example, two outlets merging and thus
reducing the total number of outlets. Finally, we illustrate the stochastic dynamic behind the
AOF effect.
Example A1. AOF Amplification effect . As discussed in Section 3, the AOF generates
an amplification effect whereby a reduction in the number of websites reporting a given signal
increeases their overall share of traffic. Such an effect can be sizeable. Consider, for example,
a search environment where M = 20, r1 uniform and where p = 0.55 and µ = 0.9. Figure A.1
illustrates the amplification effect due to a reduction in the number of outlets reporting a correct
signal, as a function of the preference for like-minded news. As the graph shows, for the case of
minority outlets (e.g., a reduction in L from 2 to 1), the amplification effect may almost double
the probability of clicking on a minority outlet reporting a correct signal. In the case of majority
outlets (e.g., a reduction in L from 16 to 15) the effect is smaller, but it may still boost the
overall traffic of such outlets by up to 15%.
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Figure A.1: Amplification effect of AOF (as a function of the preference for like-minded news, γ)
in terms of limit clicking probability of minority websites reporting a correct signal (black) when L is
reduced from 2 to 1 (black) and of majority websites reporting a correct signal (dashed) when L is
reduced from 16 to 15. In both panels, M = 20, p = 0.55, µ = 0.9, and r1 is uniform.
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Example A2. AOF with uninformative signals. Consider a search environment where
M = 20, r1 uniform and where p = µ =
1
2
. Then, as Figure A.2 shows, the limit clicking
probability of choosing an outlet reporting a correct signal is monotonically decreasing in the
number of websites with a correct signal (for 1 ≤ L < M − 1). This also shows that the AOF
effect can be generated with just flows of types of individuals, ones that are committed to one
type of content and therefore actively search for those outlets, wherever they appear in the
ranking, ones that are committed to the other type of content, and ones that are willing to trade
off one content type with the other. As discussed in the text, it is the latter that generate the
amplification effect.
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Figure A.2: Interim efficiency (PL) as a function of the number of websites with correct signal (L) for
γ = 0.33 (black line) and other values of γ (dashed lines) with uninformative signals p = 0.5, µ = 0.5.
Also, M = 20, and r1 is uniform.
Importantly, this example can also be used to show that the AOF effect occurs in environ-
ments, where individuals cannot distinguish between minority and majority outlets. In fact, it
can be seen as illustrating a situation, where individuals simply choose between different web-
sites based on two (neutral) independent cues (xn and zn) that we interpret as general desirable
attributes of the different websites.
Example A3. AOF with ordinal ranking and pure clicking realizations. Consider a
search environment, where the ranking at each time is a list from 1 to 20, and where the rank of
an outlet rt,m ∈ {1, . . . ,M} depends on the number of clicks received up to t, such that the outlet
with the greatest number of clicks has rt,m = 1, the one with the second greatest number of clicks
has rt,m = 2 and so on. Suppose also that each individual chooses a single outlet according to
the vector of choice probabilities ρn, thereby contributing a single click rather than a probability
vector (as implicitly assumed in Equation (5)). In this case, we need to change the weighting
function used to describe the individual stochastic choice. We use the function β(M−rt,m), where
β ≥ 1 again calibrates attention bias in a way that being one position higher corresponds to
receiving β times as much probability of being clicked. Otherwise, we use the same multinomial
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Figure A.3: Interim efficiency (PL) as a function of the number of websites with correct signal (L)
for γ = 0.33 (black line) and other values of γ (dashed lines) with ordinal ranking and pure clicking
realizations. M = 20, p = 0.55, µ = 0.9, β = 1.5 and r1 has all outlets L with correct signal ranked at
the bottom L positions.
probabilities of choosing a website given by:
ρt,m =
β(M−rt,m)v∗t,m∑
m′∈M β
(M−rt,m′ )v∗t,m′
.
Suppose also that r1 is a list that has all minority websites at the bottom, and where M = 20,
β = 1.5, p = 0.55, µ = 0.9. Then, the following figure shows that the limit clicking probability of
choosing an outlet reporting a correct signal is again decreasing in the number of websites with
a correct signal for L 6= 1, M−1
2
,M − 1. Notice that it is very similar to Figure 1 obtained with
the probabilistic ranking and clicking.
Example A4. AOF with merging of outlets. Consider a search environment and consider
interim realizations where the number of outlets with the correct signal varies, but where, unlike
the case with a fixed total number of outlets M characterizing the basic framework of the paper,
the total number of outlets can vary. In particular, we want to allow two outlets with the same
signal to merge such that, after they merge, the total number of outlets decreases by one. To
give an idea of what happens in this case, we show the AOF effect in an environment, where
there is a fixed number of outlets with the wrong signal, say J = 10, and where the number of
outlets with the correct signal varies from L = 0 to L = 20. In this case the total number of
outlets varies from M = 10 to M = 30. As is illustrated in Figure A.4. The effect is robust to
considering this way of changing the number of outlets with a given signal. (Note that we could
also consider the case where L is fixed and the number of outlets with the wrong signal varies.)
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Figure A.4: Interim efficiency (PL) as a function of the number of websites with correct signal (L) for
γ = 0.33 (black line) and other values of γ (dashed lines) when the number of outlets with incorrect
signal is fixed at J = 10. Also, p = 0.55, µ = 0.9 and r1 has all outlets L with correct signal ranked at
the bottom L positions.
Example A5. AOF and stochastic dynamics. Consider the search environment with
M = 20, p = 0.55, µ = 1, and γ > 0, and assume that the initial ranking r1 is uniform. Suppose
there are three websites reporting a website-minority signal. Two cases may arise. The signal is
the correct one (L = 3) or is the incorrect one (M − L = M −K = 3). In either case, the three
minority websites gain from the fact that there are few websites that report the same signal.
As a result they can attract a significant share of traffic even in the case where they report
the incorrect signal. The share depends on γ and can reach over 50% total clicking probability
for γ sufficiently large. More specifically, for small values of γ it is close to zero for L = 3 or
M − L = 3. As γ increases, more ranking probability is put on the minority websites, until it
reaches a maximum total ranking probability for values of γ sufficiently close to 1.
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Figure A.5: Left panel: Total ranking probability on three minority websites with correct signal
(L = M − K = 3) (black line); the dashed lines represent the mean dynamics trajectories for L = 1
(orange), L = 3 (green) and L = 5 (red). Right panel: Total ranking probability on three minority
websites with wrong signal (M − L = M − K = 3) (black line); the dashed lines represent the mean
dynamics trajectories for M − L = 1 (orange), M − L = 3 (green) and M − L = 5 (red) (the mean
dynamics is discussed in Appendix A). In both cases γ = 0.5 and the initial ranking is uniform.
Decreasing the number of minority websites to one or two (L = 1, 2 or M−L = 1, 2) increases
4
the total ranking probability of these websites as compared to the case of three. Similarly,
increasing the number of minority websites to four or five or more, decreases the total ranking
probability of these websites as compared to the case of three. That is, there is an advantage of
the fewer. Figure A.5 shows the evolution of the total clicking probability for the cases of L = 3
(left panel) and M − L = 3 (right panel). At the same time it shows the expected total ranking
probabilities for L = 3 (M −L = 3) and also for L = 1 (M −L = 1) and for L = 5 (M −L = 5).
The figure illustrates that decreasing the number of minority websites increases the total ranking
probability of those websites regardless of whether they are reporting the correct signal or not.
B. Rich get richer
Consider now a search environment where individuals do not have any preference for like-minded
news (γ = 0) and where there is no personalization (λ = 0). The following numerical example
shows how the attention bias (α) and the initial ranking (r1) may create a rich-get-richer dynamic.
Example B1. Initial ranking, attention bias and rich get richer. Consider an environ-
ment with (N,α, γ) = (1000, α, γ);M = 20; (κ, λ) = (100, 0). For now, assume γ = 0, µ = 1, and
consider an interim realization with L = 15 and a uniform initial ranking r1. Then, agent n’s
ranking-free website choice is:
v∗n,m =
{
1
15
if ym = yK
0 else ,
which immediately implies ρn,m = v
∗
n,m, for n ∈ N , m ∈ M . This means that all individuals
always only read websites with the website-majority signal yL = yK , and access any one of them
with the same probability 1
15
so that, with γ = 0 the website-majority signal prevails. Moreover,
since the initial ranking is uniform, the traffic is evenly distributed across websites carrying such
a signal.
Non-uniform initial ranking. Suppose now that the initial ranking is given by:
r1 ≈ (0.06, 0.059, . . . , 0.041, 0.04),
that is, the websites are ranked with increments of 1
950
≈ 0.001 starting from 0.04 going up
to 0.06. Again, since γ = 0, individuals always choose one of the fifteen websites reporting the
website-majority signal yL = yK . At the same time, the presence of a non-uniform initial ranking
provides an advantage to the websites with a higher initial ranking. In particular, as illustrated
in Figure B.1, increasing the attention bias parameter α, makes for even larger effects of the
websites’ initial ranking.
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Figure B.1: Cumulative probability of clicks per website for attention bias α = 0, 1, 1.05, 1.1, 1.25. The
graph is drawn for an initial ranking r1 = (0.06, 0.059, . . . , 0.041, 0.04) and for γ = 0 (left panel) and
γ = 0.5 (right panel).
Comparing this pattern with the one arising with a uniform initial ranking, we see that, with
a non-uniform initial ranking and α > 1, we obtain a rich-get-richer dynamic, whereby the ratio
of the expected clicking probabilities of two websites m,m′ ∈ K, with the same website-majority
signal and with r1,m > r1,m′ > 0, increases over time as more agents perform their search. The
effect is further magnified, the larger α is. When 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 the clicking probabilities tend
towards uniform ranking over the websites in K (when α < 1) and a normalization of the initial
ranking again over the websites in K (when α = 1). A similar pattern applies when γ > 0 (right
panel). 
This example shows that the evolution of a website’s ranking based on its “popularity,”
interacted with a sufficiently large attention bias (α > 1) of the individuals exhibits a rich-get-
richer dynamic, which in turn implies a tendency towards concentration of website traffic at the
top. Importantly, the differences in ranking and, then, in the expected probability of accessing a
given website, are driven by the initial ranking (r1) and are amplified by the attention bias.
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